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Abstract 
 
 In some ways it seems that the strong devotion to the figure of Hitler as a political and 
even cultural messiah on the part of the people written about in Klemperer's work is 
indicative of the regime's inherent opposition to Christianity.  The adoration which many 
showed for Hitler appears in many ways to act as a substitute for devotion to God.  This fails 
in its explanatory power, however, in that it assumes that Hitler was attempting to take the 
place of Jesus in the minds of his subjects, and that the loyalty to the state was to replace 
loyalty to God.  Hitler did cultivate a following that at times seemed religious in nature, and 
mass events such as the Nuremberg Rallies did use rituals that were taken from Christianity 
or pagan religions.  But this “religion” was not all-encompassing.  Hitler offered a solution to 
Germans' earthly concerns while Christianity offered security in the after-life.  While some 
might assume that mass spectacles in 1930s German appropriated religious rituals in such a 
way as to undermine traditional religious belief itself, I argue that the Party appropriated 
religious rituals because it would complement the religious sensibility of the spectators, and 
that this appropriation should not imply a substitution of Nazism for Christianity but rather, a 
syncretism of religion and national socialism. The two could – and did, in the belief system 
of Hitler and other Party leaders – coexist.  If key Nazi Party leaders considered themselves 
to be Christian as well as adherents of National Socialism, it is then untenable to claim a 
fundamental antagonism between the two, at least in the minds of those most intimately 
involved in setting National Socialist policy.  The possibility of devotion to both Christianity 
and National Socialism is also demonstrated by the German Christian movement.  In his 
early approval of their ideology and his desire to form one Reich Church under the auspices 
of the German Christian movement, Hitler demonstrated his desire that Christianity and 
National Socialism work together toward a common goal. 
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 Introduction 
 In The Language of the Third Reich, Victor Klemperer, a German Jewish philologist 
and professor writes of an experience that left a lasting impression on him:  
 On 13 March 1938 I innocently opened the door leading to the main banking hall of 
 the Staatsbank and started back until I was at least partially hidden by the half open 
 door. The reason being that inside everyone present, both behind and in front of the 
 counters, was standing stiffly erect with outstretched arms listening to a declamatory 
 voice on the radio.  The voice announced the law governing the annexation 
 {Anschluß} of Austria to Hitler's Germany.  I remained half-hidden in order not to 
 have to practise the salute along with everyone else.  Right at the front of this 
 gathering of people I caught sight of Fräulein von B.  She was in a state of total 
 ecstasy, her eyes sparkled, she was not simply standing to attention like the others, 
 the rigidity of her posture and salute was more of a convulsion, a moment of rapture.
1 
 
This is only one example that Klemperer gives of people he observed acting towards Hitler in 
a quasi-religious manner.  Even after Hitler's fall, Klemperer talked to an old student whom 
he quotes as having said: ―I accept all that.  The others misunderstood him, betrayed him.  
But I still believe in HIM, I really do.‖2  If Klemperer is to be believed, these statements are 
only a miniscule representation of the sorts of beliefs that many Germans had about Hitler 
and the Third Reich.  Whether Hitler intended to provoke this sort of response or not, many 
followed him with religious-like devotion.   
 When speaking of National Socialism, historians often make a clear separation 
between it and Christianity, often arguing that Nazis and Christians were diametrically 
opposed – entirely incompatible – and that Hitler employed those aspects and symbols of 
Christianity that were necessary to entice the masses, but that in the end the two could not 
exist together.  However, as Richard Steigmann-Gall argues, it is entirely possible that the 
Nazi movement was led by self-described Christians who conceived of Nazism as itself 
                                                 
1 Victor Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich, trans. Martin Brady (New York: Continuum, 2000), 
100. 
2 Ibid, 111. 
2 
Christian, which, though cutting out huge portions of traditional Christian scripture, often the 
entire Old Testament, could be considered Christian in the sense that they retained a belief in 
the redemptive work of Christ, even if that Christ was Aryan and an anti-Semite himself.
3    
 Any discussion of Christianity in relation to National Socialism must take into 
account the Nazi state's relationship to the Catholic Church, one that was fraught with much 
ambiguity.  Steigmann-Gall argues that the Nazi party leaned toward Protestantism in its 
policies and ideology, but Hitler was Catholic as a child.
4
  Although early opposition to the 
Catholic Church was not always unified or organized, it was significant.  Part of this 
undoubtedly had to do with the historical place of Catholicism in Germany; Catholicism, 
with close ties to Rome, represented a threat to an ethnic German political ideology that 
Protestantism did not.  Furthermore, the Catholic political party in Germany before Hitler's 
rise to power, the Centre Party, was unambiguously opposed to the advent of National 
Socialism.
5
  These circumstances combined to create an environment in which National 
Socialism welcomed Protestantism to a degree that it did not welcome Catholicism. 
 Not all historians agree with this extreme stance.  In ―Political Religion: The 
Relevance of a Concept,‖ Philippe Burrin argues that National Socialism was a result of the 
secularization process that had been going on in the western world for several centuries, and 
that the movement represented an effort towards reenchantment of a rational and 
individualistic world.
6
  For Burrin, Nazism was fundamentally religious in nature, although a 
                                                 
3 Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945 (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3. 
4 Steigmann-Gall, 11. 
5 Doris L. Bergan, Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 234. 
6  Philippe Burrin, ―Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept,‖ History and Memory 9 (Fall 1997): 341. 
3 
crucial part of Burrin‘s argument is the assumption that Nazism was by definition opposed to 
a Judeo-Christian worldview.  It could be argued, however, as Steigmann-Gall does, that 
Nazism, though not a political religion, drew on a Judeo-Christian – and more specifically, 
Protestant – belief system in communicating and instigating its political doctrine.7  In this 
way Nazism need not run in opposition to Christianity, but can (at least in theory) run parallel 
to Christianity, with Nazism looking to a Christian worldview for its ideological success.   
 In some ways it seems that the strong devotion to the figure of Hitler as a political 
and even cultural messiah on the part of the people written about in Klemperer's work is 
indicative of the regime's inherent opposition to Christianity.  The adoration which many 
showed for Hitler appears in many ways to act as a substitute for devotion to God.  This fails 
in its explanatory power, however, in that it assumes that Hitler was attempting to take the 
place of Jesus in the minds of his subjects, and that the loyalty to the state was to replace 
loyalty to God.  Furthermore, definitions of political religion in relation to the Third Reich 
argue for the religious function of National Socialism.
8
  Hitler did cultivate a following that 
at times seemed religious in nature, and mass events such as the Nuremberg Rallies did use 
rituals that were taken from Christianity or pagan religions.  But this ―religion‖ was not all-
encompassing.  Hitler offered a solution to Germans' earthly concerns while Christianity 
offered security in the after-life.  While some might assume that mass spectacles in 1930s 
German appropriated religious rituals in such a way as to undermine traditional religious 
belief itself, I argue that the Party appropriated religious rituals because it would complement 
the religious sensibility of the spectators, and that this appropriation should not imply a 
                                                 
7 Steigmann-Gall, 59-62. 
8 Burrin, 321-349. 
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substitution of Nazism for Christianity but rather, a syncretism of religion and national 
socialism. The two could – and did, in the belief system of Hitler and other Party leaders – 
coexist.  If key Nazi Party leaders considered themselves to be Christian as well as adherents 
of National Socialism, it is then untenable to claim a fundamental antagonism between the 
two, at least in the minds of those most intimately involved in setting National Socialist 
policy.  The possibility of devotion to both Christianity and National Socialism is also 
demonstrated by the German Christian movement.  In his early approval of their ideology 
and his desire to form one Reich Church under the auspices of the German Christian 
movement, Hitler demonstrated his desire that Christianity and National Socialism work 
together toward a common goal. 
 Emilie Durkheim offers an important theoretical perspective in considering the role of 
spectacle in the creation and continued cohesion of National Socialism.  He argues for a 
separation between the sacred and profane, and that even modern societies have sacred 
objects which they view with reverence.
9
  In addition, Durkheim argues for the centrality of 
ritual to religious belief.
10
  That is, religious rites bind people together into a religious group, 
also allowing escape from the mundane nature of the quotidian.  For Durkheim, religion is 
not about a theological or belief system, but about the rituals that bind people together.  In 
this way, the Nuremberg Rallies were fundamentally religious. 
 As has already been hinted, there were important ways in which the regime drew on 
Christian imagery, symbolism, concepts, and ideas in their creation of the Nazi state.  This 
symbolism was not limited to visual representation; written and spoken language also played 
                                                 
9 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press, 1954), 38-39. 
10 Ibid, 101. 
5 
a large role in the creation of a quasi-Christian Nazism that could be embraced by a wide 
variety of Germans.  Although this symbolism pervades Nazi events and propaganda, it is 
especially evident in the case of the Nuremberg Rallies of 1934 and 1935.  This huge display 
of Nazi power and unity and the artistic representations that followed contain several 
examples of the ways in which the National Socialist Party used Christian symbolism to 
legitimate their claim to power, such as the swastika and the messianic figure of Hitler 
himself.  In his entry into Nuremberg, Hitler presented himself as a twentieth century 
messiah, deserving of the world's respect, adoration, and unwavering obedience.  This 
presentation, however, would mean nothing without its acceptance on the part of the Rally's 
audience – ordinary Germans.  In using religious symbolism and ritual to legitimize himself 
and the Party, Hitler and the architects of the Nuremberg Rallies depended on a similarly 
religious devotion – not necessarily conscious – on the part of those in attendance.  
 By the time the Second World War began, the situation of the Church in Nazi 
Germany had unarguably changed.  In The Third Reich in Power, Richard J. Evans argues 
that many leading Nazis, including Hitler, originally had hopes of uniting all churches in one 
Reich Church.  Evans writes that ―Hitler and Goebbels‘s religious beliefs retained a residual 
element of Christianity"
11
 until the failure of the German Christian Church to unite all 
German denominations.  Up until 1935, then, Hitler embraced at least aspects of Christianity 
– a Christianity that he believed would be able to not only coexist with but also offer 
ideological underpinnings for National Socialism.  Steigmann-Gall would take this even 
further, arguing that Evans‘ ―residual elements‖ of Christianity lasted throughout the regime, 
causing, for example, a bias toward Protestantism and a continued reverence toward an 
                                                 
11  Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939 (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), 249. 
6 
Aryanized Jesus.
12
  In any case, Hitler and other leading Nazis grew increasingly anti-clerical 
throughout the 1930s, abandoning most of their allegiance to organized Christianity in favor 
of uncompromising devotion to the Nazi state. 
 This leads, then, to an interesting question concerning the Nuremberg Rallies of 1934 
and 1935.  Considering the rapidly shifting policy of the regime toward the Churches and 
institutional Christianity, what are the differences in implementation, execution, and 
representation of the two Rallies separated by one religiously and politically tumultuous 
year?  In many ways the Rallies are similar.  Both use the nature of a large-scale event like a 
rally in order to encourage an emotional reaction on the part of participants; both are filled 
with symbolism (particularly the swastika) reminding Rally-goers of the absolute supremacy 
of the Nazi state.  The 1935 Rally, however, is much more focused on war: religious 
symbolism functioned mainly in support of war.   
 Does this represent a shift in Party sentiment or policy?  Undoubtedly so.  The Nazis‘ 
increasingly pronounced hostility toward Christianity as an institution and increasingly open 
declaration of their ideological leanings was reflected in the way that they chose to portray 
themselves in the 1935 Rally.  While many of the same symbols were mobilized at the later 
Rally, the swastika and symbols of war were more highly emphasized while overtly Christian 
symbols lost their centrality.  A comparison of the Nuremberg Party Rally of 1934 and that of 
1935 thus reveals the extent to which the Nazi regime moved toward a political religion that, 
while continuing to utilize key Christian concepts, imagery, and ritual, was nevertheless 
increasingly anti-clerical and anti-establishment.   
 
                                                 
12  Steigmann-Gall, 258. 
7 
1: Hitler and the Church 
 Because of the ubiquity of religious symbolism at the Nuremberg Rally of 1934, any 
study of it must explore the underlying relationship of the Nazi regime to the Church.  Most 
historians have assumed that National Socialism and Christianity were entirely at odds.  This 
conclusion is often supported by the use of pagan party leaders and the Hitler's actions 
against organized Christianity in the mid to late 1930s and during the Second World War.  To 
do this, however, misses the state of the relationship between Hitler and organized 
Protestantism early in the 1930s, when the regime was new and hostilities had yet to form.  
Although certain Nazi leaders were always fundamentally opposed to Christianity, others had 
hope of an alliance between Church and State in which the Church would come under the 
leadership of the Nazi State.  It is only when this did not come to fruition that attitudes and 
policies began to rapidly shift. 
 The perception that Nazism and Christianity are mutually exclusive has existed for 
nearly as long as the regime existed – numerous German pastors, theologians, and historians 
who were resistant to the regime wrote books in the mid-1930s arguing that Hitler was 
fundamentally opposed to Christianity.  For example, Peter Viereck, publishing a book in 
1941 entitled Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler, includes a chapter entitled ―Nazi 
Religion Versus Christian Religion.‖  He introduces the chapter by writing that ―the subject 
of this chapter is urgently pertinent in a day when anti-Christian forces are increasing steadily 
all over the world.  Is Christianity doomed, like so many religions before it, to be replaced by 
some more modern or adaptable creed?‖13  Although Viereck acknowledges that the Nazis 
                                                 
13  Peter Viereck, Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1941), 281. 
8 
―generally sincerely admire – or profess to admire – Christ Himself,‖14 he quickly dismisses 
this as distorted theology that excludes it from true Christianity. 
Of course, works such as this were often written in response to works such as 
Professor Cajus Fabricus' Positive Christianity in the Third Reich, which argued for the 
essential compatibility of Nazism and Christianity.  Furthermore, Fabricus' work went so far 
as to argue for the Christian ethic of National Socialism.  Fabricus saw National Socialism as 
standing for kinship with God and love for one's neighbor, central tenets of Christianity.
15
  
Therefore, the works that asserted the incompatibility of Hitler and Christianity need to be 
understood in the context of the works that equally vehemently argued for their compatibility.  
All works on either side of this debate were thus part of a larger discourse which played a 
role in shaping the relationship of Hitler to Christianity.
16
  
 Also important to this discussion is the role that Hitler played as leader of the Nazi 
party in shaping both German society and historical events.  As Ian Kershaw writes, ―the key 
issue in historical-philosophical terms is the role of the individual in shaping the course of 
historical development, as against the limitations on the individual's freedom of action 
imposed by impersonal 'structural determinants.'‖17  In other words, can and should one 
interpret the Nazi regime as solely the product of Hitler's wishes and directives?  Kershaw 
argues that Hitler cannot be viewed as the sole will behind the regime.  Rather, ―the 
conditions in which Hitler's 'will' could be implemented as government 'policy' were only in 
                                                 
14  Ibid, 282. 
15 Professor Cajus D. Fabricus, Positive Christianity in the Third Reich, (Dresden, Germany, 1935), 35-71. 
16 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II: Life-world and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, Trans. Thomas McCarthy. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).  Habermas argues that 
language has a pragmatic function as part of its communicative function.  Language can thus shape reality 
and create meaning.  Language produces action. 
17 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 70. 
9 
small measure fashioned by Hitler himself.‖18  Although Kershaw argues that Hitler could 
hardly be seen as a ―weak‖ dictator, he was also not omnipotent.19  Thus, as writers on both 
sides of the ―religious divide‖ attempted to categorize Nazism as either compatible with or 
opposed to Christianity, they shaped the course of history and Hitler's relationship to the 
Church itself. 
 German nationalism had always been closely connected to Protestantism.  In order to 
better understand the relationship of German nationalism and religion, one must go back to 
the second half of the nineteenth century, when the two became explicitly linked.  Although 
this association goes back to the end of the eighteenth century,
20
 it found its fullest expression 
in sermons written for the fiftieth anniversary of Napoleon's defeat.
21
  In these sermons, 
Germans pastors argued that Germans were a collective unit that related to God in a similar 
way as the chosen people of the Old Testament.
22
  Germany's success was viewed as 
attributable to God's intervention and defeat in battle could be seen as a sign of God's 
displeasure or wrath.  
 Over the course of the next 70 years, this view underwent significant change.  As 
                                                 
18 Ibid, 91. 
19 Ibid, 92. 
20 Hartmut Lehmann, ―The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German Nationalism,‖ 
German Studies Review 14 (1991), 263.  Lehmann argues that German nationalism was linked to religion as 
early as the late eighteenth century when Herder ―expounded his view, according to which Europe consisted 
of peoples, or nations, with distinct traits and in various stages of development or maturity.‖  This was the 
same time as Germany was experiencing a period of religious revivalism. 
21 Ibid, 264-266.  The association between nationalism and Protestantism underwent four distinct phases.  The 
first phase, taking place between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the Revolution of 1830, consisted of 
German Protestants laboring for the building of the kingdom of God.  There was not as yet any sense of 
Germans as a chosen people.  The second phase, taking place between 1830 and 1848, saw the Germans as 
seeing themselves as special in comparison to the French.  During the third phase, lasting from 1848 to the 
early 1860s, German Protestants wondered why God was punishing them and concluded that if they 
abstained from sin God would bless them.  In the final phase, which lasted throughout the 1860s and until 
1871, German Protestants viewed themselves as a spiritual unit and compared themselves to the Israelites of 
the Old Testament. 
22 Ibid, 265. 
10 
Protestants became concerned with the secularization of society that they saw all around 
them, some attempted to affect change through involvement in politics.  This involved a 
slowly increasing amount of anti-Semitic rhetoric, as Jews represented a perceived threat to 
ethnic German superiority.
23
  As Social Darwinism and power politics came into the picture 
at the end of the nineteenth century as part of the increasing secularization of German 
society, German Protestants responded with a  massive campaign to link Protestantism to 
German Nationalism.  This met with mixed success; prior to 1914 German Protestantism 
appeared to be on the decline.
24
  The First World War further solidified Protestant notions of 
the supernatural forces at work in war: soldiers were God's soldiers, Hindenburg ―God's 
special tool,‖25 and Germany's eventual defeat a result of ―the work of sinister forces.‖26  
Thus Hitler's rise to power was welcomed without reservation by many German Protestants 
who supported Hitler's nationalism, his dislike of democracy, and even his anti-Semitism.  
They believed that Germany would finally experience full revival, especially given Hitler's 
support of Positive Christianity.
27
   
 German Protestantism was not, however, the only religious movement of the 
nineteenth century to have ramifications for the National Socialist era.  In The Fascist 
Revolution, George Mosse argues that National Socialism had significant occult origins.  
Members of the nineteenth century occult movement were opposed to what they called the 
―man machine.‖  They felt that Germany had become artificial and that Germans needed to 
                                                 
23 Ibid, 266. Lehmann argues that many German Christians hoped that national unification in the early 1870s  
would result in revival.  When this did not happen, some resorted to anti-Semitic preaching. 
24 Ibid, 268. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Lehmann, 261-273. 
11 
become artists in the sense that they needed to have an artistic rather than mechanical outlook 
on the world.  They were opposed to anything artificial and man-made and believed in a 
cosmic life force.  Mysticism was based on closeness to nature; uncorrupted nature could 
give a more genuine life to humanity.  Cities were seen as opposed to nature.
28
  Also 
important to German occultists were deeds – it was crucial to not only have ideals, but to act 
on them.
29
  Mosse contends that these ideals and beliefs laid the basis for the fascist regimes 
of the mid twentieth century.  Beliefs such as the idealism of deeds and rejection of positivist 
ideologies would play a large role in the formation and beliefs of National Socialism.  As the 
modern era progressed, Germans felt increasingly alienated from society, culture, and 
politics.  Mysticism and occultism offered a solution to this alienation for an increasingly 
vocal minority that would eventually manifest itself in the National Socialist Party.
30
 
 These themes of German exceptionalism, romanticism, and rejection of positivism 
continued into the twentieth century.  Steigmann-Gall describes one significant Protestant 
ideological position in Germany following the First World War as characterized by 
―liberation from materialism; Germany as God's chosen nation; domestic betrayal of the 
nation and God; honor and sacrifice; a new fight for liberation.‖31  This, according to 
Steigmann-Gall, is part of a dualistic way of thinking in which some Protestant Germans 
understood the nation to be in battle against evil.  As this dualism was also a key feature of 
Nazism, many Protestants saw Nazism as entirely compatible with their already existing 
                                                 
28 Ibid, 118-120. 
29 Ibid, 128. 
30 George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution:  Toward a General Theory of Fascism (New York: Howard 
Fertig, 1999), 117. 
31 Steigmann-Gall, 17. 
12 
beliefs.
32
 
 In 1933, Germany was, much to the chagrin of the Nazis, divided along 
denominational lines.  The German Evangelical Church, an independent organization which 
united Lutherans and Calvinists, and the Catholic Church, which owed its allegiance to 
Rome, made up the main Christian groups in Germany.  Nationalists, however, saw Germany 
as a Protestant state, and Catholics had been persecuted as recently as 1914 when French 
Catholic priests had been shown murderous hostility by German troops in the First World 
War.  Richard J. Evans argues that ―the German Evangelical church seemed to the Nazis to 
offer an almost ideal vehicle for the religious unification of the German people.‖33  Indeed, in 
1932, the German Christian movement was born as a pressure-group designed to Nazify the 
national church.  This found quick success; by the mid-1930s the Evangelical Church had at 
least 600,000 members, and won a third of the seats in the Prussian Church elections of 
November 1932.  By April 1933, at a mass meeting in Berlin, they announced their intention 
to take over the whole Church.  They pushed for ―a centralized 'Reich Church' under Nazi 
control,‖34 which they won.  The German Christians were firmly in control of German 
Protestant religious life.   
 The Nazi push for a centralized Reich Church that would support positive Christianity 
rather than the doctrine of any one denomination is crucial to understanding the relationship 
between the Nazi Party as a political entity and Christianity as a religious one.  For Hitler and 
many leading Nazis, ascribing to a pan-German movement which strove for a reunification of 
Germanic peoples under one government, the key to the successful purification and 
                                                 
32 Ibid. 
33 Evans, 220. 
34 Ibid, 223. 
13 
reunification of Germany was ascribing to a policy of strict anticonfessionalism.  As 
Steigmann-Gall asserts, Hitler arrived at this conclusion through the combination of his 
political and ideological beliefs.
35
  As a politician, Hitler asserted the importance of the 
religious neutrality of the state.  In Mein Kampf, Hitler writes: 
 When Church dignitaries make use of religious institutions or doctrines to injure their nation, 
 we must never follow them on this path and fight with the same methods. For the political 
 leader the religious doctrines and institutions of his people must always remain inviolable; or 
 else he has no right to be in politics, but should become a reformer, if he has what it takes!  
 Especially in Germany any other attitude would lead to a catastrophe.
36 
 
And yet, despite his upbringing as a Catholic, Hitler showed an unmistakable preference for 
Protestantism as a truly German religion, writing that ―Protestantism as such is a better 
defender of the interests of Germanism, in so far as this is grounded in its genesis and later 
tradition...‖37  With this bias toward Protestantism, Hitler argued in Mein Kampf for a 
reunification of all German people under the banner of Protestantism in order to better wage 
war against Germany's true enemy: the Jews.
38
  For the Nazis, Protestantism served as an 
excellent vehicle of German nationalism, as the Protestant Reformation occurred through the 
work of the German Martin Luther. 
 Not all German evangelical Christians supported the German Christian movement, 
though.  Opposing pastors formed the Confessing Church in May 1934, opposing the anti-
Semitic policies of the German Christian church and calling for a ―return to a pure religion 
based on the Bible.‖39  The Confessing Church never became a main center of opposition to 
                                                 
35 Steigmann-Gall, 62. 
36 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), 116. 
37 Ibid, 112. 
38 Ibid, 561.  Hitler writes, ―In any case the Jew reached his desired goal: Catholics and Protestants wage a 
merry war with one another, and the mortal enemy of Aryan humanity and all Christendom laughs up his 
sleeve.‖ 
39 Evans, 226. 
14 
the Nazis, mainly because the Nazis did not focus their energy fully on religious opposition 
to the regime.  As a result, the German Christians did not entirely succeed in their aim to 
unify German Protestantism.
40
   
 This reference to the aims of the German Christian movement itself raises an 
interesting question about the degree to which the German Christian movement can be 
viewed as acting on behalf of the Party's wishes.  Doris Bergan argues against the notion that 
the German Christian movement was a product of Nazism.  She asserts rather that both 
German Christianity as a movement and the Nazi party were the natural result of German 
culture in the post-WWI era.    Although the movements shared many ideological similarities, 
German Christianity should be viewed as separate from the Nazi Party and as acting on its 
own terms.
41
  Furthermore, whereas Steigmann-Gall wishes to link the rising and falling 
fortunes of the German Christian movement at least in part to Hitler and other leading Nazis' 
shifting ideologies, Bergan wishes to frame the Kirchenkampf (the struggle for power 
between the German Christians and their adversaries, the Confessing Church) as ―less an 
expression of political opposition to Nazism than a competition for control within the 
Protestant church.‖42  Certainly it is important to remember that the German Christian 
movement was composed of both Nazi Party members and non-members, and that the Nazi 
Party itself cannot be considered a monolithic movement with one aim.  There were many 
Nazi paganists who desired to silence the Church, but there were also many Christians who 
thought the Church could be useful in realizing political aims.  As Steigmann-Gall argues, the 
Party was made up of many who considered themselves Christian (both Protestant and 
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Catholic), making the line between political and religious ideology hard to define.  As a 
result, there was enough connection and overlap between the membership of the Nazi Party 
and that of the German Christian movement so as to make possible the assertion that German 
Christians had a working relationship with the regime that was initially strong and 
characterized by open dialogue and negotiation.   
 This relationship began to weaken in the months following the 1934 Rally, however.  
By the time of the Rally of 1935 things had changed.  In The Third Reich in Power, Richard 
Evans argues that a shift occurred between 1934 and 1935 in terms of Nazi policy toward 
Christian churches in Germany.  Originally, Hitler hoped to form one Reich Church with the 
help of the German Christian movement.
43
  With the ultimate failure of the German Christian 
movement to achieve a synthesis between German Protestantism and Nazi racism, Nazi 
policy began to shift.  Although Hitler still paid lip service to the German Christians, many 
leading Nazis began considering alternate religious affiliations for the regime.   
 The Catholic Church too occupied a confused place in the Nazi Regime.  Hitler, both 
admiring and fearing it, did not attack it to a large extent.  Some leading Nazis were 
nominally Catholic, and Hitler himself was raised as a Catholic.  As Stiegmann-Gall has 
demonstrated, though, Nazism leaned toward Protestantism, seeing Luther as a German hero 
and favoring Protestantism as the truly German religion.
44
  Although the Nazis did attempt to 
implement anti-Catholic measures, they did so slowly and with a consciousness of the deep-
rooted nature of the institution.  The political strength of the Catholic Church can largely be 
attributed to the official voice it found through the Centre Party, a party which was identified, 
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along with the Jews themselves, as one of the principal opponents of Nazism.
45
  Although 
anti-Catholic policies did escalate with Hindenburg's death, they did not have the desired 
effect of ―weaning the Catholic community away from its faith.‖46  By 1939, though, the 
Catholic Church's power and influence had definitely been weakened, and ―it began to scale 
down its criticisms of the regime for fear that even worse might follow.‖47 
 Furthermore, as David I. Kertzer argues in The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's 
Role in the Rise of Modern Anti-Semitism, the Catholic Church itself played a key role in the 
development of anti-Semitic sentiment in Germany in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  Themselves uneasy about the transition into modernity, the Vatican upheld anti-
Semitic policies toward the Jews in the century prior to the Holocaust.
48
  As Peter Godman 
illustrates in Hitler and the Vatican: Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story of 
the Nazis and the Church, however, even the Vatican was more fractured than previously 
assumed.  Although some planned to condemn the Nazis, eventually political complications 
and the reality that the Vatican did not have a single voice resulted in accommodation.
49
  
Eugenio Pacelli, who was Pope from 1933-1939, is seen as one of the primary parties 
responsible for this accommodation.
50
   
 Also important to keep in mind in regard to the ambiguity with which Catholicism 
was viewed by the Party was the presence within the party leadership of nominal Catholics.  
Goebbels, for instance, was nominally Catholic, and did not ever officially renounce his 
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religion.  As a member of Hitler's inner circle, though, Goebbels was careful to remain 
―above confessions.‖  In March of 1925 he wrote in his diary:  
 Catholicism and Protestantism...Catholicism is music (feeling), Protestantism poetry (reason 
 and personal responsibility).  It is no coincidence that Beethoven and Mozart are Catholics, 
 Goethe and Schiller Protestants...Every great German is Catholic in his feelings, Protestant in 
 his actions.  Protestantism is defined: Luther! Here I stand, I can do no other, God help me, 
 amen!
51 
 
Steigmann-Gall argues that the statement that Germans are Protestant in their actions, when 
compared to the idea of Nazis as men of action, implies that ―Nazis themselves, as 'men of 
action,' were similarly Protestant in sensibility.‖52  Later, as Steigmann-Gall points out, 
Goebbels became much more anti-Protestant.  However, he continued to profess an anti-
confessional Christianity, writing in 1928 that ―We have brought back the image of Christ.‖53  
Support for Protestantism and opposition to Catholicism was never as straightforward as it 
might appear.  The consistent thread running through leading Nazis' (at least those who 
considered themselves Christian) writings is that of anti-confessionalism and positive 
Christianity. 
 Most historians writing on the Christian Church and Nazism see the Nazi party as  
exploiting Christianity for its own ends.  The generally accepted argument on the issue of the 
level of opposition between Christianity and Nazism can be summed up by Doris Bergan, 
who argues that National Socialism was entirely antithetical to Christianity.  Although she 
recognizes that many Christians in Germany did not see the situation as such, she argues that 
Nazi leaders did.
54  
In the case of the Confessing Church, opposition to Hitler resulted in its 
eventual suppression.  In the case of the Catholic Church, friction existed due to its ultimate 
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loyalty to Rome.
55
  Overall, though, the relationship was more ambivalent.  Although there 
was some attempt to protest, by 1939 fear left the Catholic Church largely silent in terms of 
opposition to Nazism.
56
  Although this statement implies a fundamental incompatibility 
between the Nazis and Catholicism, it nevertheless establishes a basic cooperation between 
the Catholic Church and the Nazi regime by the late 1930s.   
 The eventual policy of accommodation on the part of the Catholic Church is in many 
ways similar to the initial attempt on the part of the German Christian movement to gain 
approval by the National Socialist Party, and raises the question of the degree to which 
Catholics eventually came to see their faith as intrinsically connected to their political 
involvement.   As the regime neared the brink of the another world war, it is certainly 
possible that the increased emphasis on anti-Semitism, a value historically held by the 
Catholic Church, appealed to the Church's perceived calling.  In an environment increasingly 
characterized by fear and violence, to fight the perceived enemy became top priority, even for 
the Catholic Church, which was originally opposed to the regime on political terms. 
 Many Party members were themselves adherents of positive Christianity.  Steigmann-
Gall identifies two main religious currents in the Nazi movement – namely, positive 
Christianity and paganism.  He argues that positive Christianity asserted the essential 
compatibility of Nazism and Christianity.  Positive Christianity even went so far as to assert 
that Nazism was in key respects derived from Christianity.
57
  D. Cajus Fabricus, writing 
Positive Christianity in the Third Reich in the mid-1930s as a defense of positive Christianity 
against those who attempted to appropriate National Socialism for paganism, argues that 
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National Socialism and Christianity share three basic traits: kinship with God, love for one's 
neighbor, and an emphasis on redemption.
58
  Of course, Fabricus' assertions mean nothing if 
not collaborated by the Nazi Party.  While official National Socialist rhetoric would shy away 
from direct association with any religious creed, the Christianity of many leading Nazis 
created a Party that, while strictly speaking considered themselves a political movement only, 
was in fact influenced by Christianity (particularly Protestantism) in important ways. 
 Even paganism, according to Steigmann-Gall, leaned toward Protestantism.  
Paganism was based in large part on ―philosophies of a much more recent past‖ than pre-
Christian Germany.
59
  Steigmann-Gall argues that paganists ―appropriated Protestantism as a 
barometer of Germanism.‖60  Although they dispensed with many Jewish elements of 
Christianity, rather than dismissing Jesus, Nazis labored to reconceptualize him as an Aryan.  
In his discussion of the occult roots of National Socialism, Mosse provides an example of 
this.  He writes of Hermann Lietz, founder of nineteenth century boarding schools, that  ―this 
religious world Lietz saw in terms of a Christianity which, as for the others, was divorced 
from Christ as a historical personage...Christ must be rescued from St Paul and emerge again 
as a hero image.‖61  Even the occult movement was in many ways Christian, admiring Christ, 
but seeing him as obscured by Paul's description of him.   
 Even though they rejected much Christian dogma, Nazis used Christian heroes of 
earlier eras as the basis of their ideology.  For example, Luther's 450
th
 anniversary 
celebrations, held in 1933, were huge events conducted by both Protestant Churches and the 
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Nazi Party.  Gauleiter Erich Koch spoke at a celebration taking place in Königsberg, making 
a clear connection between Hitler and Luther.  According to Koch, both Hitler and Luther 
were well-loved German heroes, both fought for their beliefs, and both had the same spirit.
62
  
This calls for a fundamental reordering of previously unquestioned assumptions, arguing that 
the Nazi movement did much more than simply exploit Christianity.  In fact, leading Nazis 
looked to Christian heroes such as Luther as German heroes and role models. 
 Even for historians such as Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, who argues that the paganist 
roots of Nazism can be found in the nineteenth century, the völkish movement is described in 
strikingly Christian terms:  
 Semi-religious beliefs in a race of Aryan god-men, the needful extermination of 
 inferiors, and a wonderful millennial future of German world-domination obsessed 
 Hitler, Himmler, and many other high-ranking Nazi leaders.  When the endless 
 columns of steel-helmeted legionaries marched beneath the swastika at the massive 
 martial displays of the 1930s, Germany was effectively saluting the founder-emperor 
 of a new One Thousand Year Reich.  But all this optimism, exuberance, and 
 expectation was matched by a hellish vision.  The shining new order was sustained by 
 the wretched slave-cities where the Jewish demons were immolated as a burnt 
 sacrifice or holocaust.  The Nazi crusade was indeed essentially religious in its 
 adoption of apocalyptic beliefs and fantasies including a New Jerusalem...and the 
 destruction of the Satanic hosts in a lake of fire.
63
 
 
It is as if Goodrich-Clark stops just short of stating the obvious – he uses almost entirely 
exclusively Christian language in his description of Nazism as ―religious,‖ but is unable to 
move past the traditional model of the relationship between Nazism and Christianity in which 
the two are fundamentally opposed.  The strikingly Christian nature of the imagery employed 
by the Nazis seems to suggest a relationship between Nazi and Christian ideologies that is 
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more than just coincidental.  To claim Nazism to be fundamentally opposed to Christianity 
seems to be in this case entirely untenable. 
 Often Alfred Rosenberg is held up as an example of the ideological and religious 
leanings of the regime.  This is largely because of his position as the most prominent paganist 
in the party.  Rosenberg aspired to greatness, and often his aspirations are taken as 
representative of historical reality.  This is simply not the case.  Although he published many 
works, including The Myth of the Twentieth Century, which many hold to be a guide to Nazi 
thinking, these works were never official.  In addition, Hitler himself expressed many 
reservations in terms of the usefulness of the book as a potential guide to Nazi ideology.
64
 
 Rather than being wholeheartedly supportive of paganism, as many wrongly assume, 
Hitler was open to the idea of supporting religion.  In his memoir Inside the Third Reich, 
Albert Speer, a leading Nazi architect, quotes Hitler as having said, ―The church is certainly 
necessary for the people.  It is a strong and conservative element...Through me the 
Evangelical [Protestant] Church could become the established church, as in England.‖65  
Further, Speer claims that 
Even after 1942 Hitler went on maintaining that he regarded the church as 
indispensable in political life.  He would be happy, he said in one of those teatime 
talks at Obersalzberg, if someday a prominent churchman turned up who was suited 
to lead one of the churches—or if possible both the Catholic and Protestant churches 
reunited...he sharply condemned the campaign against the church, calling it a crime 
against the future of the nation.  For it was impossible, he said, to replace the church 
by any ―party ideology.‖  Undoubtedly, he continued, the church would learn to adapt 
to the political goals of National Socialism in the long run, as it had always adapted 
in the course of history.
66 
 
Although these sorts of statements were often made in public, they are no less significant 
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than if Hitler had written them in Mein Kampf.  Hitler may not have himself claimed to be a 
Christian, and certainly he did not require adherence to Christianity on the part of German 
citizens.  Rather, he required absolute adherence to himself and his regime.  In order to 
legitimate this claim to power, however, Hitler used the Church, recognizing it as an integral 
part of German culture.  He recognized that his ability to bring together the public and 
private aspects of life in Nazi Germany would ensure his legitimacy as leader, and thus 
nurtured and utilized the faith of ordinary Germans.  On a fundamental level, then, Hitler and 
Christianity went hand in hand.   
 This sort of conclusion is supported by the argument of Robert P. Ericksen, who, in 
his work on the relationship of the German churches and the Nazi regime, argues that the 
stories of a few heroic individuals such as Martin Niemoller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer (who 
were vocally opposed to national socialism) have tended to muddy historians' perceptions of 
the Kirchenkampf (church struggle) that occurred in the 1930s.  Although many assume 
Kirchenkampf to refer to resistance to the regime, Ericksen points out that it actually refers to 
conflict within the church over internal church matters.
67
  As part of a larger argument about 
the complicity of German churches and universities in the Holocaust, Ericksen asserts that 
both Protestants and Catholics largely welcomed the Nazi regime.  Although Catholics 
opposed certain tenets of the new regime's policies, in large part their response to the events 
of 1933 was the same as that of Protestantism.
68   
 If it is true that National Socialism's relationship to the Church was more complicated 
than simply one of repression and persecution, could it also be possible that the regime 
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operated under a Christian—or more specifically, Protestant—ideology?  There seems to be 
some evidence that this was indeed the case.  For example, in The Nazi Primer, which served 
as the official primer for the Hitler Youth, Fritz Brennecke writes that ―Even today the racial 
ideas of National Socialism have implacable opponents.  Free Masons, Marxists, and the 
Christian Church join hands in brotherly accord on this point.‖  Although this seems 
shockingly clear in its implications, Brennecke goes on to say that ―The Christians, above all 
the Roman Church, reject the race idea with the citation 'before God all men are equal.'‖69  
Although he uses the phrase ―the Christians,‖ Brennecke's criticism seems directed almost 
exclusively at Catholicism, which finds its authority in Rome.  Protestantism, on the other 
hand, finds its roots in Germany, and thus is spared the scathing condemnation reserved for 
the Roman Church.   
 Of course, National Socialism distanced itself from being considered religious in any 
sense.  As Waldemar Gurian argues in Hitler and the Christians, ―since it [Christianity] 
threatens to split the Germans into various denominations, it must be thrust into the 
background by great national, unifying, experiences.‖  Gurian goes on to assert that Hitler 
thus attempted to ―whistle off those of his followers who favour over-drastic measures and 
want to emulate the escapades of a Dinter or a General Lundendorff.‖70  Gurian takes this to 
mean that Hitler was simply allowing Christianity to exist for the time being out of the 
knowledge that an outright attack would create insurmountable resistance to the regime.  
Gurian argues that for Hitler the Christian  
 whose obedience to God brings him into conflict with on or other of the demands of the 
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 National Socialist world theory is nothing less than a hypocritical perverter of true, inward 
 Christianity, which in its own real interest must be protected against this perverter.  There are 
 no such persons now as martyrs for the faith; there are only currency smugglers, political 
 priests, and squabbling pastors.
71 
 
Furthermore, according to Gurian's interpretation of National Socialist ideology, Christianity, 
like all religions, was to be considered simply a system of morals based entirely on the 
improvement of society – a means to an end.  National Socialism, in contrast, was something 
that went beyond this world – something living and eternal – an end in itself.72 
 Of course, a significant element of Nazi leadership was opposed to Christianity from 
the outset.  This is nowhere better reflected than in the anti-Christian sentiments reflected in 
Hitler Youth liturgy, which, though arguably be influenced by Christian ritual and liturgy, 
was also infused with a undeniable hostility to a faith that would demand loyalty above and 
beyond the loyalty required by Hitler's state.  At the 1934 Nuremberg Rally, the Hitler Youth 
sang the following song: 
We are the jolly Hitler Youth, 
We don't need any Christian truth 
For our Leader Adolf Hitler, our Leader 
Always is our interceder. 
 
Whatever the Papist Priests may try,  
We're Hitler's children until we die; 
We follow not Christ but Horst Wessel. 
Away with the incense and holy water vessel! 
 
As sons of our forebears from times gone by 
We march as we sing with banners held high. 
I'm not a Christian, nor a Catholic, 
I go with the SA through thin and thick.
73 
 
At times it seems as if fundamental aspects of Christian ritual and belief were being attacked.  
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As yet another example, German youth in Cologne were instructed to sing the following song 
before meals: 
Führer, my Führer, bequeathed to me by the Lord, 
Protect and preserve me as long as I live! 
Thou hast rescued Germany from deepest distress, 
I thank thee today for my daily bread. 
Abideth thou long with me, forsaketh me not, 
Führer, my Führer, my faith and my light! 
 Heil, mein Führer!
74 
 
A similar invocation followed after meals, being similarly written as a prayer to Hitler.   
 If these songs and prayers dedicated to Hitler took the place of their Christian 
counterparts, how are we to understand them?  Nazism took care to make its worldview 
expressible in a religious manner.  Nazism strove to replace Christianity, but, significantly, 
they also used the traditional forms of Christianity in doing so, even employing Christian 
imagery to make their point.
75
  It is also possible that rather than striving to immediately 
replace Christianity, Nazism attempted to co-opt key aspects of Christianity to further their 
power, not wishing to destroy operating Christian belief that did not result in resistance to the 
regime.   
 Gilmer W. Blackburn's argument in ―The Portrayal of Christianity in the History 
Textbooks of Nazi Germany‖ reflects the possibility that Christianity was acceptable as long 
as it did not threaten German concepts of their own racial supremacy.  Although he argues 
that the ultimate aim of the Nazi regime was ―the utter annihilation of the Christian faith,‖76 
he also points out that Nazi textbooks taught young children that ―'God . . . helps his people' 
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but only 'when they are brave and resourceful.'‖77  While some textbooks followed this vein 
of thought, others were more obviously against the spirit of Christianity.  For example, So 
Ward Das Reich argued that Christianity was the single largest threat to the Germanic spirit.
78
 
 Clearly politics and the Volk came first for the Nazi regime.  This does leave room, 
however, for the transformation of Christianity, in the form of the German Christian Church, 
into an institution that upheld and reflected the seemingly opposing ideology of the Nazi 
regime.  This possibility is nowhere better reflected than in an excerpt from the Kirchliches 
Jahrbuch für die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland concerning principles that the German 
Evangelical Church was adopting in order to better adhere to the Nazi regime:  
The Evangelical Church has learned from Martin Luther to distinguish sharply 
between the realms of reason and faith, politics and religion, state and Church.  The 
National Socialist world view is the Volkish-political doctrine which determines and 
forms the German man.  And as such it is also binding upon German Christians.  The 
Evangelical Church honors a divinely established order in the state and demands 
from its members a total service in this order.
79 
 
This unequivocally establishes the relationship, at least on an official level, of the German 
Christian Church to the Nazi state.  It seems as if in this area Hitler was successful in his aim 
to appropriate a surprisingly willing Christianity for his own ends.  The German Christian 
movement was more than willing to accommodate Hitler and National Socialism.  For a time, 
it seemed as if Hitler was willing to accommodate them. 
 A traditional reading of the symbolism present at the Nuremberg Rally of 1934 would 
assume any religious symbolism to be either exploitative or coincidence.  This paper will 
argue quite the opposite – that in considering the complexity of Nazi leaders' relationship to 
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religion, and even Christianity, one must assume that for many of the individuals involved in 
the planning and presentation of the Rallies, religion was more than something to be 
exploited in the souls of the attendees.  Rather, these Nazis' religious convictions were 
inextricably tied to their political convictions, and many Nazi leaders saw no reason to make 
religion and politics mutually exclusive.  Rather, there was a basic syncretism of religion and 
politics and the level of the Nazi leadership. 
 Any consideration of religion's place at the Nuremberg Rallies must not only consider 
Hitler and leading Nazis; also important are the masses that took part in the Rallies.  The next 
chapter will consider these people – what their relationship was to Hitler, to the party, and to 
religion.  It will consider theories of fascism in order to place the Nuremberg Rallies in their 
larger historical context.  More importantly, it will look at the experience of the Rallies for 
those attending.  The Nuremberg Party Rallies were a place of high emotion, it is true, but the 
willing and enthusiastic participation of the onlookers hints at a deeper acquiescence with the 
regime than one may initially assume.  Taking the Nuremberg Rallies seriously as indicative 
of the mood of the country in the early to mid-1930s means a possible reconsideration of the 
theory that the regime maintained power through coercion.  The Rallies offer a quite different 
picture of the mood of the populace just after the birth of the Third Reich, one in which Rally 
goers were willing participants in what they saw as a revolution. 
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2: Hitler and the Masses 
 Although Hitler and other party leaders undoubtedly played an important role in 
shaping the movement, it is also important to keep in mind the way that their ideas and 
mandates were received by ordinary Germans.  To label Nazism as Christian is one thing, but 
if the people did not sense or relate to this religiosity, it loses much of its meaning.  Those 
Christians who attended the Nuremberg Party Rallies would have needed to experience their 
Christian beliefs as entirely compatible with their political beliefs in order for any ideological 
intentions of Hitler or Nazi leaders to have a real effect.  This is particularly the case when 
considering the Nuremberg Rallies, which undoubtedly found much of their emotional power 
through the participation of the masses. 
 First though, one must consider the nature of fascism itself.  Was Hitler simply a 
strong personality to whom people in an economic crisis gravitated in sheer desperation?  Or 
was Hitler simply a product of his time, a gauge of the national temperature?  This question 
has existed since Hitler first came to power.  First writing in 1933, Wilhelm Reich was one of 
the first to address this issue.  In The Mass Psychology of Fascism, he argues that one cannot 
assume Hitler's ideas to have been simply transmitted to mindless followers.  Rather, Hitler 
was able to come to power because of a convergence of belief between him and the people 
who held many of the same opinions.  More specifically, Reich writes that “only when the 
structure of the führer's personality is in harmony with the structures of broad groups can a 
“führer” make history.‖80  Fascism itself, according to Reich, is ―only the organized political 
expression of the structure of the average man's character, a structure that is confined neither 
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to certain races or nations nor to certain parties, but is general and international.‖81  
Furthermore, Reich argues that fascism is ―borne and championed by masses of people.”82    
 
Reich also seeks to explain throughout his book why the working-class chose Nazism 
instead of a Marxist revolution.  Reich argues that to understand political repression, one 
must understand sexual repression.  Sexual repression, Reich argues, is inherently present in 
an authoritarian society.
83
  As a Freudian analyst, Reich argues that just as a child represses 
his/her sexuality out of fear of punishment, so adults obey the state out of fear of punishment.  
Keeping food or water from someone will cause her to rebel.  But the suppression of sexual 
desires results in a reactionary mentality with no rebellion.  Not only do people fear 
punishment for political rebellion just as they do for sexual rebellion, Reich goes so far as to 
argue that sexual repression in German society created a nation of people, who, because of 
their sexual repression, were overly docile and exceedingly prone to reactionary politics.  
Reich argues that a child has a natural sexuality from early childhood.  Parents have moral 
reason to inhibit this sexuality from developing further, and this results in the inhibition of 
the child's genital sexuality as well.  The child becomes docile and obeys out of fear.  After 
this, all important decisions, even those that are life and death, are accompanied by fear.  Just 
as sex is a forbidden thought, any sort of thought accompanied by fear becomes forbidden as 
well.
84
  Into this environment stepped National Socialism, offering not only a revolution but a 
return to a mythical, agrarian past.  This was something to which already repressed people 
could more easily adhere, an alternative that appealed to their fear of disobedience and the 
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consequences that disobedience brings.    
 Even if some should have disagreed in principle with National Socialism on the basis 
of its inability to provide for material needs, as Reich argues is the case with Germany's 
lower middle class, the lower middle class'  unique position in German society in the early 
1930s resulted in their support of the regime.  Although Reich points out several reasons for 
this, important to this discussion is his argument that the lower middle class felt a sense of 
identification with the state as an authority figure and as an entity that bestowed them with 
authority.
85
  As Reich writes, 
The economic position of the average official is worse than that of the average skilled 
industrial worker; this poorer position is partially compensated by the meager 
prospect of a career, and in the case of the government official by a lifelong pension.  
Thus dependent upon governmental authority, a competitive bearing toward one's 
colleagues prevails in this class, which counteracts the development of solidarity.  
The social consciousness of the official is not characterized by the fate he shares with 
his coworkers, but by his attitude to the government and to the 'nation.'  This consists 
of a complete identification with the state power; in the case of the company 
employee, it consists of an identification with the company.  He is just as submissive 
as the industrial worker.  Why is it that he does not develop a feeling of solidarity as 
the industrial worker does?  This is due to his intermediate position between authority 
and the body of manual laborers.  While subordinate to the top, he is to those below 
him a representative of this authority...
86 
 
Thus, as Reich points out, the middle class man does not act in his actual best interests as a 
result of the authoritarian mindset with which he was raised. 
 In addition to arguing that middle class men felt a sense of identification with the 
state, Reich also points out that the lower middle class had a unique position in the capitalist 
production process of the early 1930s.  As industrialization continued, small business owners 
found themselves increasingly marginalized.  Whereas German nationals in 1932 warned that 
the lower middle class would have to choose between middle and working class, the National 
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Socialist party did not create such a gap, thus appealing to this sector of German society.    
 Although Reich's attempt to stay away from assuming that Germans were simply 
befogged by Hitler is valuable, his argument's dependence on Freud and preoccupation with 
sexual repression makes this attempt problematic.  Colin Wilson argues in The Quest for 
Wilhelm Reich that there is actually no evidence whatsoever that repressed sexuality formed 
the basis for fascism.
87
  Furthermore, Wilson writes that ―the overall impression of The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism is of a man determined to oversimplify for his own purposes.  Reich 
is basically an anarchist who hates all authority, and believes that sexual freedom is the 
answer to all mankind's problems.‖88  Many of Reich's ideas were, as Wilson points out, 
clearly misguided and motivated by desperation and paranoia.  His ideas about the 
convergence of the ideas of the Führer and ordinary Germans are valuable, though, and must 
not be discarded along with his more dubious theories. 
 Perhaps a fuller answer to the question of the degree of the masses' acceptance of 
Hitler lies outside of psychology.  In The Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor W. Adorno approach the subject of Hitler and National Socialism through the 
question of the impact of ―enlightenment‖ on the twentieth century masses.  According to 
their theory, enlightenment, although taking the place of myth and religion, is in the final 
analysis itself only a myth.  They argue that science, as a system of signs, is fundamentally 
flawed.  Because it is made up of signs which are removed from nature, it is in the final 
analysis only aestheticism.
89
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 Furthermore, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that Enlightenment thought rejects 
individuality and creates the herd.  Rather than individuals making autonomous and 
individually meaningful decisions, ―the liberated finally themselves become the 'herd.'‖90  
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, this is because the enlightenment creates systems, like 
the signs mentioned above.  Anything not reducible to these systems is simply non-existent.  
Under this system of thought, all people are equal, and this equality erases individuality and 
difference.
91
  Relevant to our discussion, they argue that has much to do with National 
Socialism – in particular the Hitler Youth.  They write: 
Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from all 
others, so that it could all the more surely be made the same.  But because that self 
never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment throughout the liberalistic period has 
always sympathized with social coercion.  The unity of the manipulated collective 
consists in the negation of each individual and in the scorn poured on the type of 
society which could make people into individuals.  The horde, a term which 
doubtless is to be found in the Hitler Youth organization, is not a relapse into the old 
barbarism but the triumph of repressive égalité, the degeneration of the equality of 
rights into the wrong inflicted by equals.
92 
 
Horkheimer and Adorno further argue that fascism is but the result of the ―trajectory of 
European civilization.‖93  Although Nazism may appear to be a regression to a lesser state of 
civilization, this is not the case.  Rather, what some would see as a ―mob mentality‖ simply 
reflects the end result of Enlightenment.  Enlightenment's ―freedom‖ produces the herd.   
 This is not all.  According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the Enlightenment has created 
a machine.  This machine (namely capitalism and industrialization), although destructive to 
the masses, must be operated by them in order to continue running.  They continue running 
the machine because they have been taught to believe in the objective reality of the laws that 
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have produced capitalism.  Unfortunately, the reality is that just as the enlightenment 
replaced myth with science, science once again becomes myth, in the form of the ―'intuitions' 
of the Führer.‖94  And there is nothing to be done: ―The powerlessness of the workers is not 
merely a ruse of the rulers but the logical consequence of industrial society, into which the 
efforts to escape it have finally transformed the ancient concept of fate.‖95 
 Not all scholars see fascism as the inevitable progression of Enlightenment, however.  
In A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern 
Democracy, Jonathan Israel argues that there were two competing strands of Enlightenment: 
radical democratic and moderate monarchical.
96
  According to Israel, one of the principle 
problems with the moderate strand is that there was no room for criticism of existing political 
or societal structures.
97
  So while its proponents believed in progress, progress itself was 
limited by their very belief in it.  Radical Enlightenment is characterized by egalitarianism, 
democracy, and is responsible for much of the social reform in the modern Western world.
98
  
National Socialism was neither of these, but rather followed in the tradition of many radical 
Counter-Enlightenment movements throughout the centuries before.  Counter-Enlightenment 
insists ―on the primacy of faith and tradition, not reason, as the chief guides in human 
existence,‖ and is the result of the ultimate failure of the Moderate Enlightenment to offer an 
alternative to the Radical Enlightenment.
99
   
 For the purposes of this discussion, it is not important to arrive at a conclusion as to 
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whether or not National Socialism was the natural result of the Enlightenment. More pressing 
is the ―herd‖ that Enlightenment thought created, a herd that at least partially believed the 
propaganda and pseudo-science.  This ―herd‖ surely recognized the political-religious aspects 
of mass events such as the Nuremberg Party Rallies, but within the context of the elaborate 
pseudo-scientific ideology presented to the public through every medium available to the 
regime, a Germany already familiar with the thought processes of the Enlightenment would 
have been easy prey. 
 Is there a way to define fascism itself keeping in mind the above theoretical 
perspectives?  Robert O. Paxton, in arguing for a definition of fascism that encompasses the 
variety of movements in the twentieth-century western world, approaches the question of 
fascism in a more straightforward manner, attempting to come to a working definition of 
twentieth-century fascism.  He concludes that fascism is 
a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community 
decline, humiliation, or victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and 
purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in 
uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic 
liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints 
goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.
100 
 
This definition claims to represent a compromise between two extremes – one extreme that 
defines fascism in purely Marxist terms (with ideology or the leader's personality taking little 
or no part), and the other extreme which dominates popular perceptions of fascism (with 
Hitler creating a police state where people were simply cowed into submission).
101
  In 
defining fascism as ―a form of political behavior,‖ Paxton attempts to avoid concentrating on 
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either the leader or the nation removed from one another.
102
  To this end, he points out a 
boundary in definition between authoritarianism and fascism.  Whereas authoritarians strive 
to keep the public passive and uninvolved, fascism seeks to engage and excite the public.
103  
  
This understanding of fascism works well when considering the role of spectacles such as the 
Nuremberg Rallies in the maintenance of public support of the regime.  Paxton considers 
both Hitler and the masses to have played an important role in the rise of fascism.  This 
definition of fascism goes a long way toward creating a framework through which one can 
understand the Nuremberg Rallies. 
 Paxton also places the rise of fascism within a particular historical context – that of 
post- Great War Europe.  Gone were ideas of the progress of humanity, in its place crept 
despair.  Europe was politically and economically strained.
104
  Fascism began in Italy in 
March of 1919 with a group of about one hundred people committed to fighting socialism 
with a particular brand of nationalism: National Socialism.  National Socialism was born in 
Italy; Germany followed close behind.
105
  
 The distinction between the Party and Hitler himself also needs to be considered.  For 
example, Ian Kershaw argues that support for Hitler himself was probably much higher than 
was support for the ideology of the National Socialism.
106
  This raises some difficult 
questions, however, as it openly contradicts the argument furthered by Wilhelm Reich.  Was 
ideological consensus necessary, after all?  Kershaw argues that it was not – that the Party 
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retained the illusion of ideological support through furthering the ―Hitler Myth.‖  According 
to this theory, Hitler carefully cultivated his public image so as to appeal to a wide variety of 
people and ideological stances.  He intentionally separated himself from politics in order to 
keep necessary distance from unpopular policies.
107
   
 Other historians see support for Hitler not limited to Hitler himself.  Thomas Childers 
argues that support for National Socialism was not limited to just one class, but was very 
broadly spread across the lower and middle classes.
108
  This diverse support was not always 
very deep, making it tenuous at best and the party highly unstable.  However, anti-modern, 
anti-Semitic ideology is what caused the party's rise in the polls in the first place.
109
  
According to Childers, this is where Hitler stepped in; at the moment when the movement 
was in the most danger of losing their momentum entirely, Hitler was appointed chancellor, 
not by his lower and middle class supporters, but by upper-class elites.
110
   
 In his biography of Hitler, Joachim C. Fest argues against the notion that Hitler's rise 
to power was a historical accident, citing the mass enthusiasm that greeted Hitler's 
appointment as chancellor.
111
  Unlike Childers, though, Fest refutes the idea that Germans 
welcomed Hitler because they were anti-Semitic.  In explaining the appeal of Nazism, Fest 
points to a ―directionless craving for morality.‖112  National Socialism preached values such 
as obedience, bravery, and loyalty, thus filling this void.  This desire for moral direction 
could certainly be argued to complement the Party's efforts to create mass-events such as the 
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Nuremberg Rallies that were ritualistic in nature. 
 Although it is certainly important to consider the role of ordinary Germans in the rise 
to power of the Nazi party, it is equally crucial to consider the process of Nazification.  That 
is, what level of resistance to the regime could be found among the working poor, for 
instance?  Is it really as Wilhelm Reich argued in The Mass Pyschology of Fascism wherein 
no one resisted because they all agreed?   Even if Hitler's rise to power was eagerly 
welcomed by a large amount of Germans, did this change in the years following?   
 The trend has been to downplay support of the regime, arguing that the majority of 
people were frightened into submission or entirely apathetic.  This is reflected, for example, 
in the work of Timothy W. Mason, who, in his study of the German labor movement of the 
early to mid-1930s, concludes that by the time that the reality of Nazi labor policy became 
clear, it was too late to resist.
113
  Jill Stephenson writes about the reactions of women to the 
regime, limiting her discussion primarily to women who resisted, fled, or became 
apathetic.
114
  An exception to this is found in the work of Claudia Koonz, who, in her study 
of Nazi mothers, concludes that the role of mother was crucial in allowing the regime to 
maintain a veneer of respectability.  Because women were traditionally relegated to the 
spheres of home and church rather than politics, Koonz argues that Nazi women were able to 
ignore political realities in favor of viewing Hitler as their messiah.
115  
Even this, however, 
assumes a level of psychosis on the part of anyone insane enough to agree with Hitler's 
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policies. 
 Wolfgang Benz goes in a slightly different direction in his consideration of the 
manner in which National Socialism achieved the consent of its subjects.  According to Benz, 
Nazi ideology was meager at best.  In spite of this, Benz argues that the Party enjoyed the 
positive commitment of the majority of the population.  Furthermore, this positive 
commitment was not achieved through violence, as many assume, but through the constant 
invocation of the Volk as a type of mystical unity.
116
 
 According to Benz, the process of attaining and retaining the public's support 
contained five elements.  First, propaganda served as an instrument through which to create 
an authoritarian democracy in which the will of the party matched that of the people.  
Second, the Nazis orchestrated public life in such a way as to mesmerize participants.  Events 
on both a small and large scale took place throughout the year – the Nuremberg Party Rallies 
are only one example.  Third, the Nazi party attempted to create a National Socialist 
aesthetic, mostly through large-scale, brutalized neo-classicist architecture.  The goal was an 
―architecture of subjection‖ that would act as instruments of political pressure by 
communicating the power of the regime.
117
  Fourth, Benz argues that Nazism made an effort 
to offer itself as a substitute for religion.  He points to the particularly religious aspects of the 
cult of the dead and honoring of heroes.  Finally, the religious aspects of Nazism were not 
solely based on ritualistic acts, but the Führer myth itself was a way of giving Germans an 
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object of religious devotion in the person of Hitler himself.
118
 
 Although Benz's analysis gets back to questions of the religious orientation of Nazism 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is also important to consider Benz's assertion that the 
devotion of the majority of German citizens was achieved without the use of violence.  For 
Benz, events such as the Nuremberg Rallies were the points at which the Party was able to 
implement the five elements enumerated above.  Propaganda and mass events rather than 
violence offer the best way to understand early approval of Hitler and the regime.  For those 
who approved, it was not about rational consideration of policies and their moral 
ramifications.  Benz argues that the Party's goal and purpose was as follows: 
The rule of National Socialism was founded on the ecstasy of the ruled.  The 
conquest, exercise and consolidation of power involved, to an extent unrealized by 
any other regime, the devising of institutions and mechanisms whose purpose was to 
transport the populace into a form of permanent intoxication and to generate and 
maintain a climate of mass hysteria – a climate in which a constant, unreflected 
acclamation of the regime thrived.
119 
 
This was achieved through the regular implementation of events such as the Nuremberg Party 
Rallies, although this particular event was certainly only one of many.  Was it possible that 
events such as the Nuremberg Rallies were able to have such a large effect on the minds and 
emotions of ordinary Germans?  Memoirs of attendees at the Rallies provide some idea of the 
degree to which these events were successful in their planners' goal of ―permanent 
intoxication.‖   
 William Shirer, an American war correspondent who in his diary detailed his 
experience of the Nuremberg Rally, provides some insight into the interconnectedness of 
ritual and experience on the part of both German spectators and participants in the rally.  In 
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writing about the presentation of Hitler's Labour Service Corps on September 6, Shirer writes 
that ―there was a ritual even for the Labour Service boys.  They formed an immense 
Sprechchor—a chanting chorus—and with one voice intoned such words as these: 'We want 
one Leader! Nothing for us!  Everything for Germany!  Heil Hitler!'‖120  Shirer writes that 
the spectators responded to the Corps' goose-step by going ―mad with joy,‖ noting ―what an 
inner chord it strikes in the strange soul of the German people.‖121  Of primary interest here is 
Shirer's use of words such as ―ritual,‖ ―chanting chorus,‖ and ―soul;‖ all of which carry 
religious connotations.  Not only was the event planned as a ritual, but the people responded 
with religious abandon to this demonstration of Nazi power.   
 In his diary, Shirer notes the intensity of public devotion to Hitler at the 1934 
Nuremberg Rally, writing: 
About ten o'clock tonight I got caught in a mob of ten thousand hysterics who 
jammed the moat in front of Hitler's hotel, shouting: 'We want our Führer.'  I was a 
little shocked at the faces, especially those of the women, when Hitler finally 
appeared on the balcony for a moment.  They reminded me of the crazed expressions 
I saw once in the back country of Louisiana on the faces of some Holy Rollers who 
were about to hit the trail.  They looked up at him as if he were a Messiah, their faces 
transformed into something positively inhuman.  If he had remained in sight for more 
than a few moments, I think many of the women would have swooned from 
excitement.
122 
 
As is shown in this excerpt, Shirer reiterates again and again the religious quality of ordinary 
Germans' devotion to Hitler.  They are described as ―hysterics,‖ ―crazed,‖ and ―transformed‖ 
in Hitler's presence.  These people were clearly deeply affected by the overpowering 
experience of the Rally.  These excerpts support Benz's claim that hysteria played a role in 
the public's support of Hitler as leader, as well as providing an example of a mass event that 
                                                 
120 William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941 (New York: 
Popular Library Eagle Books, 1941), 19. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Shirer, 17. 
41 
had far-reaching implications for the widespread acceptance of and support for the regime. 
 In his diary, Victor Klemperer writes of crowds of people listening to Hitler speak at 
other events and Hitler's ability to create a ―frenzy:‖  
In the selection from his diary, Vom Kaiserhof zur Reichskanzlei...Goebbels reports 
on 10 February 1932 on a speech given by the Führer in the Sportpalast: 'Towards the 
end he built up to a wonderful, incredible rhetorical pathos and closed with the word 
Amen!, it sounded so natural that everybody was deeply shaken and moved by it . . . 
the masses in the Sportpalast were soon caught up in a frenzy . . .'  This Amen 
demonstrates clearly that the general thrust of this rhetoric was religious and 
pastoral...
123 
 
This is important for at least two reasons.  First, it illustrates the ability of Hitler to influence 
people on a religious level.  Secondly, the people clearly reacted in the way that Hitler 
wanted them to.  Hitler did not only desire to cause a frenzy; he achieved it.  It can be safely 
assumed that the same sort of thing occurred at the Nuremberg Rally of 1934.  This carefully 
crafted and presented spectacle had just the effect that Hitler wished it to – the people were 
caught up in a frenzy of devotion to their country's leader. 
 Of course, the Nuremberg Rally was but one week out of the year, and although other 
mass events provided opportunities to get caught up in political fervor, the reality of day-to-
day life should not be neglected.  This is illustrated in Erik Larson's In the Garden of Beasts: 
Love, Terror, and an American Family in Hitler's Berlin.  At times, the pomp and pageantry 
were overt, unmistakable, and even all-encompassing, but much of the time American 
ambassador William E. Dodd and his family were able to almost forget that the Nazis were in 
power.  Daily life remained mundane and charming; politics were not ubiquitous.
124
  The 
particular function of the Rallies, then, was to provide attendees with an out of the ordinary 
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reminder of the presence of National Socialism and the importance of adherence to its 
ideological imperatives. 
 Furthermore, people certainly had practical reasons for their acquiescence to the 
regime.  The 1920s and early 1930s had been economically difficult for Germans, with 
poverty and unemployment running rampant.  As part of his attempt to win over the masses, 
then, Hitler needed to implement a variety of welfare programs.  In ―'The Struggle Against 
Hunger and Cold': Winter Relief in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939,‖ Thomas E. de Witt argues 
that popular acceptance of National Socialism had a great deal to do with their economic 
policies.
125
  De Witt focuses in particular on the winter relief program implemented in the 
winter of 1933.  This program encouraged individuals to ―voluntarily‖ donate to a fund to aid 
the poor.  The government expended few resources, simply relying on propaganda to 
encourage individuals toward generosity.  According to de Witt, the success of the program 
acted as a barometer of the degree to which the German people had accepted Nazi 
ideology.
126
  Not all Nazi propaganda centered around spectacle and emotion-driven mass 
events.   
 Part of Hitler's success undoubtedly lay where the bleak day-to-day reality of life met 
the mass enthusiasm of his somewhat unexpected rise to power.  This is supported by the 
recollections of Ursula Meyer-Semlies, who, in an interview with oral historian Alison 
Owings, recited a portion of a poem that was popular in the years before Hitler's rise to 
power: ―O God, send us a Führer who will change our misfortune, by God's word.‖127  
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According to Meyer-Semlies, political and economic chaos combined with a fear of 
communism made reception of Hitler enthusiastic.
128
 
 One fascinating aspect of Urula Semlies' recollections is her ambivalence toward the 
relationship of her religious beliefs to her political beliefs.  Looking back on the 1930s, 
Semlies seems to recall that many no longer believed in ―this Christian fuss.‖  In spite of 
pressure to the contrary, Semlies claims to have retained her Christian beliefs, saying ―I sent 
a short prayer to heaven and said, 'Well, for me, Christmas is still always a Christian 
Christmas.'‖129  When she told the SS with whom she was conversing that she was 
politically-speaking National Socialist and religiously-speaking Christian, she recalls that the 
SS responded by saying ―That is precisely the wrong way around.  The Führer wants the 
whole human being, and if there is still any region in your heart that does not belong to the 
Führer, then you are not a convinced National Socialist and then the Führer cannot influence 
you.‖130   
 Perhaps most fascinating about the above account is how Semlies ends her recounting 
of the conversation.  The SS got off the train saying that they would ask her again in ten 
years and then it would be clear who was right regarding this clearly divisive issue.  She then 
tells of the difficulty she had in deciding whether or not to join the Nazi party, which she 
eventually ended up doing.  It is clear that, for Semlies, she concluded that her political and 
religious beliefs did not need to be mutually exclusive, even in the face of some who thought 
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otherwise.  After all, as she recalls, ―And much that Hitler did we found good.‖131 
 This theme of conflict between those who found Nazism to be entirely antithetical to 
Christianity and someone like Semlies, who considered herself both a Christian and a Nazi, 
continues throughout her account.  On the one hand, this seems to read as Semlies' 
acknowledgment that – in retrospect, at least – she was wrong.  It is important to take into 
consideration, however, the fact that this interview took place nearly half a century after the 
events she is recalling.  This half century had been one in which resistance to the regime was 
praised, and Christians consciously separated themselves from the horrors of the Holocaust.  
Semlies' account thus takes an apologetic tone, as if to say, ―I was both a Christian and a 
National Socialist, which I see now was a grave error on my part.‖  We should, therefore, not 
read this as an absolute statement of the mutual exclusivity of the two. 
 In many ways, the attempt to indoctrinate the populace in national socialism was 
constant, although this indoctrination did not always happen by way of spectacle.  As 
Klemperer writes,  
From 1933 to 1945, right up until the catastrophe in Berlin, this elevation of the 
Führer to the status of a god, this alignment of his person and his actions with the 
Saviour and the Bible, took place day by day and always 'went like clockwork' and it 
was impossible to contradict it in any way.
132 
 
According to Klemperer, this constant elevation of Hitler took place largely through the use 
of language.  When Hitler was mentioned in writing, religious epithets accompanied his 
description.
133
  With Germans being constantly reminded of the god-like status of their 
country's leader, it is probable that attendance of a mass event such as the Nuremberg Rally 
                                                 
131 Ibid. 
132 Klemperer, 105-106. 
133 Ibid, 107. 
45 
of 1934 simply confirmed the things they already read, heard, and saw every day by simple 
matter of living in Germany.  Although the Nuremberg Rallies may have served as an 
emotional high point for Rally goers, the ideology that accompanied it was nothing new to 
the vast majority. 
 This frenzy of devotion is noted in other studies of mass events during the Nazi era.  
In Karen Fiss' study of France's reception of German culture in the 1930s and Germany's 
attempts at cultural seduction of France, she notes the ―visual power of Nazi spectacle.‖134   
For Fiss, though, Nazi political pageantry represents more than just an emotional collective 
experience.  She argues that events such as the Nuremberg Rallies appeal to the audience 
because ―they offer the image of a reconstructed organic totality as a kind of antidote to the 
fragmented experience of modern life.‖135  Of course, the pageantry does not offer any real 
solution; it is merely an illusion.  In addition, Walter Benjamin argued in 1936 that fascism, 
through art forms such as cinema or a rally, ―short-circuits the potential for societal change 
by offering the masses self-expression in place of real political action...[defined as] the 
aestheticization of politics.‖136  The Nuremberg Rallies, then, were so effective in part 
because they served as an intensely emotional experience that allowed for expression without 
action. 
 It seems that ordinary Germans attending the Rally were not the only ones 
emotionally influenced by the Rally‘s events.  In The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, 
William Shirer shares one possible account of Hitler‘s experience of the 1934 Rally: ―‘It is 
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wonderful!‘ [Hitler] exulted at Nuremberg to the foreign correspondents at the end of the 
exhausting week of parades, speeches, pagan pageantry and the most frenzied adulation for a 
public figure this writer had ever seen.‖137 Although Shirer falls into the same patterns as so 
many others, distancing Hitler‘s ―pageantry‖ from Christianity by identifying it as pagan, 
what is important is that Hitler seems to have reacted emotionally in much the same way as 
other attenders.  It seems that the Rallies took on a life of their own; although it is tempting to 
ascribe agency for the outcome of the Rallies, the ritual, the euphoria, and the nationalist and 
religious character of these Party events were beyond the ability of any one person or 
committee to orchestrate.   
 Shirer also gives an account of the 1938 Nuremberg Rally, the last of these events 
before the outbreak of war halted them entirely, from Hitler‘s perspective.  This particular 
rally took place right before Hitler was scheduled to give an announcement on the fate of 
Czechoslovakia.  As Europe waited to find out what Hitler had decided, the Rally went on as 
normal, with Hitler reserving the announcement of his decision for the last day.
138
  Hitler‘s 
involvement in the Rally seemed to have an influence on his decision, though, at least 
according to some leading generals of the army.  Shirer writes that:  
On September 8 General Heinrich von Stuepnagel saw Jodl and the latter noted in his 
diary the General‘s pessimism regarding the military position in the west.  It was 
becoming clear to both of them that Hitler, his spirits whipped up by the fanaticism of 
the Nuremberg Party Rally, which had just opened, was going ahead with the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia whether France intervened or not.  ‗I must admit,‘ wrote 
the usually optimistic Jodl, ‗that I am worried too.‘139 
 
It seems that the Nuremberg Party Rallies served to enhance what many saw as Hitler‘s 
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fanaticism.   
 First-hand accounts of mass-events in Nazi Germany seem to overwhelmingly 
support the notion of a religious-like fervor that created a mass consensus to National 
Socialism.  It is certainly possible that this was the case; the emotional impact of the 
Nuremberg Rallies for the majority of the attenders cannot easily be denied.  This needs to be 
more closely examined, though.  Did people respond with religious-like devotion because 
they were simply overwhelmed by the huge scale and emotional quality of the event?  
Alternatively, did they come to the Rallies already convinced?  What purpose did these 
events really serve – did they serve primarily as avenues of conversion to a creed or did they 
simply affirm preexisting beliefs?  As a work of art, the Rallies served as a mode of 
expression for people facing a modern, scientific world stripped of enchantment.  As a 
political event, the Rallies offered a sense of belonging to something bigger than themselves, 
a reminder that each individual attending was not alone.  At the Nuremberg Rallies, National 
Socialism presented itself as the obvious solution to the economic, political and even 
religious concerns of the majority of ordinary Germans.  National Socialism itself did not 
pretend to offer salvation in the afterlife; for this it turned to Christianity. 
 This alliance of religion and politics took a clear form at the 1934 Nuremberg Party 
Rally.  Taking place at a time when the relationship between the Church and the State was 
still being sharply contested, the ubiquity of religious symbolism should not be surprising.  
Although some of its use was for the clear purpose of setting Hitler and the Nazi Party up as 
worthy of political allegiance, the use of Christian symbolism also implies a level of comfort 
with Christianity that is not consistent with a concerted attempt to destroy its presence within 
48 
the new Nazi state.  The next chapter will examine the role that Christian symbols played at 
the Nuremberg Rally of 1934 as a way of more clearly understanding the relationship of 
National Socialism to Christianity. 
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3: Symbolism, Ritual, and Representation at the 1934 Nuremberg Party Rally 
 
 The Nuremberg Rallies were full of symbolism and ritual that gave them their 
distinctively religious atmosphere.  This took many forms, from the ubiquitous presence of 
the swastika to ceremonies to honor fallen soldiers from the Great War.  These rituals and 
symbols served two purposes.  First, they catered to an audience accustomed to the rituals 
and symbolism of Christianity.  Second, the co-opting of religious symbolism and ritual 
infused the Rallies with a sense of optimism and hope that encouraged a quasi-religious 
response on the part of Rally-goers.  Without a religious aspect, the Nuremberg Rallies would 
have simply been a collection of political speeches persuasive only to the degree that they 
made rational sense.  Many of the same symbolic and ritualistic forms were used in both the 
1934 and 1935 Rallies.  The emphasis shifted, however, and it is in this shift that we can 
detect larger developments in the regime itself both as the reality of life in the Third Reich 
became apparent to German citizens and as the priorities of the regime shifted in preparation 
for war. 
 A significant part of National Socialism's appropriation of Christianity was its use of 
the swastika as a national symbol.  The presence of the swastika itself as the German national 
symbol during the Third Reich is a prime example of the ways in which Nazi symbolism was 
informed by religious themes and beliefs.  The swastika is an ancient religious symbol found 
in many places throughout the world.  Early versions have been found dating from as early as 
2000 B.C., and the Hissarlik—another early version of the swastika—was a part of Aegean 
culture until around 1100 B.C., whence it then moved toward Europe through Greece and 
later Italy.  The Germans began using it as an ornament and decoration for plaques at the end 
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of the Bronze Age. It was eventually adopted by Christians by the mid-sixth century A.D.
140
   
 Although the origins of the swastika are not precisely known, Hitler used the swastika 
in large part because of its supposed Aryan roots, saying ―We believe that someday Heaven 
will unite all Germans in one Reich, not under the Soviet star or the Jewish Star of David, but 
under the Swastika...‖141  The swastika was in fact not used only by Aryans, having been 
retained in a non-Aryan form by the Freemasons.  Although the Nazis abhorred Freemasonry, 
there were aspects of it that appealed to them – particularly the fact that one needed to have 
certain knowledge and experience to gain entry to graduated levels of Freemasonry.  This 
was strikingly similar to German occultists, who had similar entry restrictions based on 
race.
142
   
 In 1874, archeologist Dr. Heinrich Schliemann, while discovering the remains of 
ancient Troy, discovered evidence of the swastika's use in the region in ancient times.  This 
discovery, thought to prove the Aryan origins of the swastika, was used to transform the 
swastika into a symbol of Aryan ascendancy.  As ideas of racialism and eugenics gained hold, 
the swastika, a prominent ancient icon, came to embody these ideas.  Many thus believed the 
swastika to be associated with anti-Semitism.
143
 
 Hitler clearly saw the swastika as emblematic of the Nazi mission.  In Mein Kampf, 
he wrote: 
 As National Socialists, we see our program in our flag.  In red we see the social 
 idea of  the movement, in white the nationalistic idea, in the swastika the mission of 
 the struggle for the victory of the Aryan man, and, by the same token, the victory of 
 the idea of creative work, which as such always has been and always will be anti-
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 Semitic.
144
 
 
For Hitler, the swastika was more than just decoration for the Nazi flag; it encompassed ―the 
mission‖ that the Nazis believed themselves to have.  Heller supports this idea, writing ―By 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, German racist mystics and occultists adopted 
the swastika as their sacred icon of racial purity and invented a heritage and lore to support 
it.‖145  According to this view, Nazis appropriated the swastika for use as a national symbol 
with deep religious significance attached. 
 One should not necessarily assume the occult aspects of the swastika's origins to 
signify a rejection of Christianity.  A key facet of German Christian ideology was the idea 
that the Germans were a sort of chosen people, chosen by God for the destruction of the 
Jews.  The swastika, then, fit nicely into this worldview; as a symbol with what was thought 
to be Aryan roots, the swastika became a symbol equal to the Christian cross, but not 
intended as a replacement.   
 In noting the religious aspects of the swastika, one should not neglect the more 
practical and economic aspects of its appeal.  According to Wilhelm Reich, the swastika held 
a special appeal for the working class.  Reich quotes the lyrics to a song centered around the 
swastika:  
We are the army of the swastika 
Raise the red banners high, 
For the German worker 
The way to freedom we shall pave.
146 
 
As noted earlier, Reich believed fascism to be a convergence of belief between Hitler and the 
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masses who followed him.  This is just one more example of the ways in which this 
manifested itself; in this case, the swastika acted as piece of propaganda employed by the 
Nazis to remind the German working class of just how similar their goals were to those of the 
Party.
147
   
 The swastika was not the only Nazi symbol which came to have religious 
significance.  Linguist Victor Klemperer, writing about the SS symbol rather than the 
swastika, supports this notion.  He writes:  
Within the LTI itself, the special jagged form of the letters SS represents for me the 
link between the visual language of the poster and language in the narrower sense.  
There is also another link of this kind: a similarly jagged torch, either erect or turned 
towards the ground – the rune of blossoming and wilting.  As a symbol of passing 
away it was only used as a replacement for the Christian cross on death 
announcements, whilst in its other form, pointing upwards, it not only served as a 
replacement for the star on birth announcements, but also appeared on stamps used 
by chemists and bakers.  One would assume of course that these two runes would 
become as established as the SS symbol, given that they too were encouraged on 
account of their physicality and Germanness.  This was not the case however...
148 
 
After discussing further the occasional use of the SS symbol instead of the star and cross on 
death announcements, Klemperer continues: 
As a jagged character the rune of life was related to the SS symbol, and as an 
ideological symbol also related to the spokes of the wheel of the sun, the swastika.  
And thus, as a result of all this, it was the most obvious thing on earth that the cross 
and star would be entirely displaced by the runes of life.
149 
 
In these excerpts from The Language of the Third Reich, Klemperer, in making a larger 
argument about the link between visual language and written and spoken language, clearly 
equates the SS symbol with a sort of religious symbolism.  The fact that at times the SS 
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symbol took the place of the cross or star points to the religious function of the symbol.  
Although this did not happen as often as Klemperer would have expected, his connection of 
these two things is significant nonetheless.  Klemperer's inability to make a case for the 
replacement of the cross by the SS symbol does not negate the fact that he believes an 
attempt was made toward this.  Alternatively, it is possible that the cross and SS symbol 
served much the same purpose in the minds of those writing death announcements. 
 The eagle was also a major part of Rally symbolism – almost any poster made for the 
Nuremberg Rallies prominently featured it.  The use of the eagle as symbol went beyond the 
Nuremberg Rally, though.  In fact, the spread-eagle motif in German history goes all the way 
back to the first Empire of Charlemagne, and served in pre-Nazi times as a symbol of 
strength and unity hearkening all the way back to the Roman Empire.  Nazis co-opted this 
symbol along with the swastika, displaying the eagle on national flags and all over at the 
Nuremberg Rally of 1934.
150  
The eagle, with its wings outstretched, became a symbol of 
strength and power to be used by the Nazis to create an atmosphere of almost religious 
excitement. 
 At times the alignment of Christianity and Nazi symbolism was more direct.  The 
German Christian movement, being the officially recognized Protestant church of Germany 
during the Third Reich, seemed fully to embrace Nazism.  The German Christian flag itself 
made explicit connections between the Third Reich and Christianity through the use of 
symbols.  The flag, pictured below, consisted of a large Christian cross with a swastika at the 
center of the cross.  The flag's background was red, giving the flag a strikingly similar 
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aesthetic to that of the Nazi flag.
151
  This mixing of Christian and national symbolism on the 
part of the German Christian movement is a clear example of the swastika's use alongside 
religious symbols, and speaks to the co-existence of political and religious imagery.
152 
  
Furthermore, the German Christian flag flies in this image alongside both a flag with a cross 
and the Nazi flag itself, which only enhances the mixture of national and religious 
symbolism.  This seems excellent evidence of the syncretism of political religion and 
Christianity. 
                         
 Regardless of any debate over the purpose of symbolism at the rallies, it was 
ubiquitous, and had a huge effect on Rally-goers.  In his diary, William Shirer, the American 
journalist who spent much time in Germany during the Nazi regime and kept a diary of many 
of the things he experienced, supports this interpretation of the rally.  He writes: ―Tens of 
thousands of Swastika flags blot out the Gothic beauties of the place, the façades of the old 
houses, the gabled roofs.  The streets, hardly wider than alleys, are a sea of brown and black 
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uniforms.‖153  This was one of the first things that Shirer noted; when attending the rally, one 
could not help but notice the omnipresence of the swastika. 
 The use of flags themselves, regardless of the specific form they took, also was used 
in a symbolic manner.  As Hilmar Hoffman argues, although flags no longer had a utilitarian 
function (identification of troops in battle, for example), they still stood as ―a symbol of life 
in the midst of the general threat of death.‖154  The flag, therefore, served a very important 
symbolic function at the Nuremberg Rallies, invoking nationalistic victory and ultimately the 
importance of absolute loyalty to the state.
155
   
On August 20, 1934, just weeks before the 1934 Nuremberg Rally, the Nazis passed a 
law that made the flag pledge not only an oath of loyalty to the German nation, but also to 
Hitler himself.  It read as follows: ―I swear before God this sacred oath, that I will yield 
unconditional obedience to the Führer of the German Reich and people, Adolf Hitler, the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and, as a brave soldier, will be ready at any time 
to lay down my life for this oath.‖156  In including the national flag and its symbol, the 
swastika throughout the Rally grounds, the Rally planners were sending a very significant 
message: fealty to Hitler and his party was inextricably tied to one‘s status as a loyal German.   
 The symbolism employed at the rallies was not only visual; Christian millennialism 
also played a significant role.  Hitler's Germany was (and is) known as the Third Reich, 
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which was said to be the ―Thousand-Year Reich‖ during which peace and prosperity would 
reign.  It is significant that Hitler first used this phrase at the Nuremberg Rally of 1934.  As 
Hamilton T. Burden points out, Hitler hailed the coming of a new era of ―greater national 
unity and strength‖ that made the loss of freedom suffered by Germans a small price to pay.  
Burden argues that this was the context in which Hitler first coined the phrase ―Thousand-
Year Reich,‖ saying: ―The nervous nineteenth century has reached its end.  There will not be 
another revolution in Germany in the next 1,000 years.‖157  The number ―1,000‖ itself has 
religious significance: Christians believe that after defeating the anti-Christ, Christ himself 
will reign on earth (either literally or figuratively) for 1,000 years.  Hitler thus invokes a 
number with positive religious meanings.  Although the figurative anti-Christ, the Jews, had 
not yet been entirely defeated, this was only a matter of time; thus, Hitler welcomed a 
millennium of peace and prosperity where good would prevail.  
 Hitler's reference to unity may very well have had religious significance as well.  As 
noted earlier, the Nazis made early and repeated attempts to unite the Protestant Church 
under one organization – the German Christian Church.  On September 5, in Nuremberg, 
Shirer writes that Hitler ―also referred to the fight now going on against his attempt to Nazify 
the Protestant church.  'I am striving to unify it.  I am convinced that Luther would have done 
the same and would have thought of unified Germany first and last.'‖158  Here Hitler appeals 
to the Christianity of his listeners in a manner that reflected his own agenda – a unified, state 
controlled religion. 
 The Nuremberg Party Rallies undoubtedly played a significant and immediate 
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propagandistic purpose.  It is hardly questionable that to attend a rally would have been an 
incredible and emotionally affecting experience.  This was in large part because of the 
architecture of the Rally.  In the early twentieth century, German architecture saw a shift 
toward architecture for a mass audience, architecture that was used to court the middle and 
lower class.  Gathering places that promoted unity and community were no longer simple, 
but rather infused with spectacle.  According to Kathleen James-Chakraborty in German 
Architecture for a Mass Audience, there were three main assumptions of the time in regard to 
the power of architecture over an audience seen as entirely passive.  First, centralized space 
possessed the unique power to bring people together.  Second, harmony of the past could be 
recreated through art, not necessarily through politics.  Third, allusions were to be replaced 
by spectacle, which would be much easier to understand for the working class.
159
  These 
assumptions were reflected in architectural planning of the Rallies.  Chakraborty points to the 
use of light as one example: light played an important role in transforming the Rallies into a 
spectacle that would impress a mass audience.
160
 
 The 1930s were an age of rapidly expanding technological capabilities, and the radio 
and movies were increasingly important to the successful control of public opinion.  In the 
case of the Nuremberg Rallies, film played a hugely influential role in shaping public 
perception of the events.  On September 4, 1934, the first day of that year's Nuremberg Rally, 
Hitler made a dramatic entrance by plane into Nuremberg, Germany, being greeted by an 
immense crowd of adoring Germans.  This day was captured for posterity (and undoubtedly 
propaganda) by Leni Riefenstahl in unprecedented artistic style, being made into a film 
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entitled Triumph des Willens, or Triumph of the Will.  This film offers both casual viewers as 
well as historians an intimate glimpse into the official mood of the week's festivities, 
allowing viewers, if not to experience the rally's reality, to at least grasp its intended purpose 
as propaganda. 
 One thing that stands out as one watches the film is the obvious presence of 
symbolism.  This takes several forms.  According to Richard Barsam, the use of symbols 
such as the swastika, the eagle, and the ―Horst Wessel‖ song encourages an emotional 
involvement on the part of all involved.
161
  The eagle and the swastika are seen throughout 
the film, serving as a visual reminder to the viewer of the central themes of the Nuremberg 
Rally.  Barsam argues that the eagle was associated with Hitler throughout the film.  In any 
case the eagle served to reinforce the very German quality of the event. 
 When watching The Triumph of the Will, one cannot miss the swastika.  It appears in 
countless frames, constantly reminding the viewer of the rally's purpose.  The camera pans 
over cheering, ecstatic crowds with the Nazi flag fluttering conspicuously in the background, 
never far from view.  The people themselves wave flags bearing the swastika.  The use of the 
swastika as symbolism, when combined with the euphoric mood of the film, gives The 
Triumph of the Will a distinctly emotional, and even religious atmosphere, if only in the sense 
of the state and its  leader as commanding a worship akin to the honor one would give God.  
Hilmar Hoffman argues as much in his analysis of the role of flags in Riefenstahl‘s film, 
writing that: 
Riefenstahl used the flag as an emotional and sentimental prop with which to 
orchestrate a dizzying symphony of flags which disseminated the Nazi world-view in 
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staged aesthetic events that indicated the ―correct‖ way to regard art.  In films such as 
Sieg des Glaubens (Victory of Faith, 1933) and Triumph des Willens (Triumph of the 
Will, 1934), she transformed the flag into a fetish…162 
 
The swastika, then, most specifically in its use as a flag, contributed directly to the religious 
atmosphere of the rally.   
 The third scene of the movie begins with ―a mood of peace and tranquility.‖163  As 
scenes from the town drift by, ―the hymn, ―Awake! The dawn of day draws near‖ from Act 3 
of Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg‖ plays softly but triumphantly in the background.  This 
only adds to the religious quality of Riefenstahl's presentation of the rally.  Church bells 
sound as the song draws to a close.
164
 
 In his analysis of the rally, Barsam explicitly identifies strong religious undertones.  
Indeed, when analyzing The Triumph of the Will, one cannot miss the clear parallels between 
Hitler's entrance into Nuremberg and Jesus' entrance into Jerusalem.  Hitler's ―triumphal 
entry‖ into Nuremberg in many ways exceeds that of Jesus.  Hitler descends from the sky in a 
plane (appropriately adorned in swastikas), and rides a motor car through the streets, 
mirroring Jesus' procession through the streets of Jerusalem on a donkey.  Hitler, mirroring 
Jesus' reception with palm branches, is adored by the crowd who prepares his way with 
raised hands and loud cheering.  According to Barsam, ―One remarkable close-up reinforces 
the messianic presence of the Führer by capturing the sun as it is refracted in the upraised 
palm of his hand.‖165  In this sense, Hitler himself becomes a symbol – arguably, the most 
powerful symbol of all, at least in the context of the film.  The replacement of the Nazi 
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swastika with the Christian cross only adds to the sense of national-religious triumph. 
 Hitler also sets himself up as a Christ-figure in his warm reception of a young girl 
whose mother holds her up so she can offer him flowers.  Making a special effort to greet her, 
he even pauses the parade by stopping his car.  Throughout the film, Hitler is shown 
interacting with children in various ways; one boy is shown ―whose face is full of wonder 
and awe at the sight of Hitler's magnificent automobile.‖166  This warm and friendly portrayal 
of Hitler is arguably a direct reflection of Mark 10:13-16 (NIV), in which children are 
brought to Jesus to receive his blessing.  Jesus goes so far as to chastise his disciples for 
discouraging these children from approaching him.  This popular image of Christ is one that 
Hitler emulates in his entry into Nuremberg.  He presents himself as someone who can relate 
to and is adored by children.  The children's apparent trust in him only adds to the overall 
sense that one can and should trust this beloved leader who promises to return Germany to 
her previous greatness.   
 In a scene portraying a rally of the Hitler Youth groups, Hitler addresses the young 
people.  This speech contains many aspects of Nazi ideology.  First, nation is given priority 
over anything else.  He repeatedly refers to the youth as ―German‖ and refers to Germany's 
glorious and unified future.  Second, the Nazi concept of the Volk comes through when he 
says ―And I know it cannot be otherwise because you are flesh of our flesh, blood of our 
blood, and your young minds are filled with the same spirit that dominates us.‖167  During his 
time in power, Hitler carefully cultivated the concept of the Volk, a community based on ―the 
notion of blood, or race...‖ that ―...posited an organic relationship that went beyond the idea 
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of citizenship, maintaining the racial ties of one individual to another and one generation to 
the other.‖168  Thirdly, in this speech to the Hitler Youth, Hitler appeals to the concept of the 
Volk in religious terms.  Fourthly, he says ―You cannot be but united with us,‖ arguably 
invoking a statement by Jesus, who said ―He that is not with me is against me; and he that 
gathereth not with me scattereth abroad.‖ (Matthew 12:30, KJV)  In addressing the Hitler 
Youth in such a manner, Hitler makes a clear effort to educate the next generation of 
Germans in the ways and ideology of the Nazi Party. 
 Riefenstahl's use of Hitler as a religious figure and symbol is also powerfully 
illustrated in a later scene, which is an outdoor memorial service and military review.  This 
scene, which according to Barsam is intended to be a demonstration of the Nazis' strength 
and vitality, begins by remembering Germany's dead.  Barsam writes that ―Here, the Führer, 
the 'lord of creation,' is bringing Germany back to life, and here, at his hand, is the largest 
display of that life—almost one million men marching as if they were one single force.‖169  
Barsam hints that both the event itself and Riefenstahl's representation of it have a similar 
mood: ―Here the solemnity and simplicity of the ceremony are matched by the dignity and 
restraint of the photography and editing.‖170   
 Others have offered differing but not contradicting analysis of the film.  In ―Triumph 
of the Will: Notes on Documentary and Spectacle,‖ Steve Neale argues for the centrality of 
spectacle in Hitler's entrance to the rally by plane.  He writes: ―All these forms of 
codification are designed to exhibit the image for the gaze of the spectator and for the scopic 
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drive that sustains it, designed, precisely, to 'catch' (to lure) the eye.‖171  As the film begins to 
show the crowds awaiting Hitler's arrival in Nuremberg, Neale argues that the other central 
aspect of the film, looking, enters the equation.  As the film switches between scenes of the 
plane and Hitler and the adoring masses, Riefenstahl establishes Hitler as the object of 
looking, the ultimate spectacle.
172
  She repeatedly affirms Hitler as spectacle throughout the 
film.  Further, Neale argues that ―looking, therefore...is not only the foundation of spectacle 
in its relations with the spectating subject, it is also the means by which the film coheres as a 
film – linking the images together and to a large extent specifying their meaning.‖173  In 
blurring the line between the film and the event itself in terms of the spectacle of each, 
Riefenstahl makes a bold attempt to represent the Rallies as closely to reality as possible, or 
at least to establish Hitler as a spectacular figure worthy of one's political loyalty.  
 One must exercise caution in any account of the Nuremberg Rally of 1934.  It is 
entirely possible that many of the religious themes that Riefenstahl exploits were not 
intentional on the part of the event's planners.  It is, however, significant that Riefenstahl was 
asked by Hitler himself to make this film.
174
  He approved of and encouraged the making of 
the film, thus giving it a certain legitimacy as a representation of the symbolism of the Rally.  
Furthermore, as Hilmar Hoffman argues in his analysis of Riefenstahl, Riefenstahl‘s Triumph 
des Willens succeeded in defining the ―fascist film aesthetic.‖  Her films aimed to ―exert 
emotional influence‖ which, coincidentally, was arguably also Hitler‘s main political 
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strategy.
175
  Riefenstahl‘s film did not create a fictional reality through film, but rather, 
Triumph des Willens, according to Hoffmann, encapsulated  
an extra-aesthetic reality with aesthetic means in such a way that the people who 
lived in this reality recognized themselves in it—as parts of a crowd.  Reality was 
thus not utilized aesthetically in order to pretend what it was.  After all, Riefenstahl 
was herself piously fixated on this actually existing National Socialist reality.
176
 
 
 It is also important to note that other firsthand accounts of the Rally ostensibly written 
at the time (before being exposed to Riefenstahl's portrayal of the film) contain this 
acknowledgment of religious themes.  In his diary written during the rally, Shirer writes,  
Borrowing a chapter from the Roman church, he is restoring pageantry and colour 
and mysticism to the drab lives of twentieth-century Germans.  This morning's 
opening meeting in the Luitpold Hall on the outskirts of Nuremberg was more than a 
gorgeous show; it also had something of the mysticism and religious fervour of an 
Easter or Christmas Mass in a great Gothic cathedral.  The hall was a sea of brightly 
coloured flags.  Even Hitler's arrival was made dramatic.  The band stopped playing.  
There was a hush over the thirty thousand people packed in the hall.  Then the band 
struck up the Badenweiler March...Hitler appeared in the back of the auditorium, 
and...he strode slowly down the long centre aisle while thirty thousand hands were 
raised in salute.
177 
 
This description bears striking similarities to Hitler's triumphal entry portrayed in Triumph of 
the Will, leading one to conclude that someone observing the Rally would be hard pressed to 
not note the religious aspects of the event. 
 Furthermore, Riefenstahl's film was sought out, approved, and championed by the 
Nazi Party.  The Rallies themselves were conceived as a cinematic experience, both for those 
present and for those who would one day watch the film.
178
  According to Karen Fiss in 
Grand Illusion, ―the visual power of Nazi spectacle relied on its fusion of a modern aesthetic 
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with the scopic inscription of a unifying and totalizing will.‖179  The Rally was a place, 
unlike the chaos of day to day life in a modern age, where life seemed organic, simple, and 
unified.
180
  This was evident not only for attenders of the event, but, thanks to Riefenstahl's 
film-making, to movie-goers as well.  In allying herself to the ideological beliefs of the 
regime, Riefenstahl made possible the aesthetic pleasure for the masses. 
 Even if the film could be considered different in its impact due to editing and physical 
and emotional distance from the grandness of the event, the cameras could not miss the 
ubiquity of political symbols.  This is particularly true in the case of the use of the swastika.  
Albert Speer, as self-described ―chief decorator‖ of the Nuremberg Rallies, wrote a memoir 
about his experiences as Hitler's leading architect.  He details his experiences and strategy in 
decorating for the Nuremberg Rallies.  Of his use of the Nazi flag and swastika, he writes:  
At that time I dearly loved flags and used them wherever I could.  They were a way 
of introducing a play of color into somber architecture...Of course it was not 
altogether consonant with the flag's dignity to use it mostly for decorative effect, for 
accenting the pleasing harmonies of certain façades or covering ugly nineteenth-
century buildings from eaves to sidewalks.  Quite often I added gold ribbons to the 
flag to intensify the effect of the red.  But it was always scenic drama I was after.  I 
arranged for veritable orgies of flags in the narrow streets of Goslar and Nuremberg, 
with banners stretched from house to house, so that the sky was almost blotted out.
181 
 
Speer, in writing his memoir, often expresses self-disgust at having so willingly followed 
Hitler.  This is evident in this excerpt with his use of the phrase ―at that time.‖  Even with 
Speer's apologetic tone, his use of ―somber‖ or ―the flag's dignity‖ make clear the role that he 
intended the flag to play in the event.  Furthermore, his desire to create ―veritable orgies of 
flags‖ that would almost blot out the sky indicates his desire to create an experience of civic 
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religiosity.  In Hitler's triumphant entry into Nuremberg, flags rather than palm branches 
would line his path. 
 As noted in a previous chapter, by 1935, Hitler's relationship to the German Christian 
movement had changed significantly, and the regime was becoming ever so slightly more 
hostile to organized Christianity.  The shifting priorities of the regime are no more evident 
than in the focus of the 1935 Nuremberg Rally when compared to that of 1934.  In 1934, the 
Rally's concerns revolved around the birth of the Thousand-Year Reich and an argument for 
the end of the revolution in favor of cultural peace and prosperity.  Hitler was firmly in 
power; the revolution had ended, ushering in the beginning of 1,000 glorious years for 
Germany.  Significantly, Hitler also called for state control of the church under the pretext of 
its unification.  Racism was not absent by any means; Hitler attacked Jewish intellectualism, 
arguing for the need for purification of German art after its infiltration by Jews.  A speech by 
Dr. Gerhard Wagner on the second day reflected Nazi ideas of social Darwinism and survival 
of the fittest.  Concepts of peace, courage, and the ultimate God-given mission of the German 
people were continually invoked by Hitler and other leading representatives of the Party.
182
   
 In spite of this, the 1935 Rally at Nuremberg was in many ways even more extreme in 
tone.  Anti-Semitic speeches were a part of this Rally as well, but this year the regime took 
concrete steps in their war against the Jewish threat.  The Nuremberg Laws were unveiled at 
the 1935 Nuremberg Rally, giving the event a particularly anti-Semitic tone.  This war 
against Judaism and Communism were not only backed by laws; the military took center 
stage at this rally in a way that they had not in 1934.  While the 1934 Rally had a day devoted 
to the military, its focus in many ways seemed to be on uniting Germany under Hitler and the 
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relatively new Third Reich.  The 1935 Rally, however, juxtaposed continued insistence that 
Germany only wanted peace and prosperity with the centrality of her armed forces.  For 
example, a military parade on Monday, September 16 included 100,000 men and 100 war 
planes and heavy bombers.  Furthermore, in his closing speech Hitler emphasized the 
importance of both a unified party and a modern army in creating a strong Germany.
183
 
 This emphasis on the military and war is also evident in Leni Riefenstahl's film of the 
1935 Rally.  Whereas Triumph des Willens concentrates on symbolism, crowds of adoring 
Germans, and images of a peaceful Nuremberg, Riefenstahl's Tag der Freiheit is infused 
throughout with a strong military theme.  Although, like in her earlier film, the swastika is 
prominent throughout, the swastika serves decidedly different purposes in the 1935 Rally.  
Whereas the swastika of the 1934 Rally invoked ideological unity and pointed to the 
ritualistic aspects of the Rally, the swastika of the 1935 Rally invoked war.
184
 
 By late summer of 1935, when the Nuremberg Party Rally took place, Hitler's 
concerns had shifted from consolidation of the regime to rearmament for war.  In addition, 
with a Reich Church no longer an option, any religious symbolism employed at the rally 
tended to be almost entirely devoid of any real Christian content.  Although the influence of 
Christian ritual was clear, and Christian concepts appeared from time to time, Christianity no 
longer needed to play such a central role.  Hitler had established himself as the unequivocal 
leader of the German nation, and concentrated on calling his people to war against their 
enemies. 
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Conclusion 
 The Nuremberg Rallies were in many ways primarily designed as displays of state 
and military might, and any discussion of the religious context of the Rallies cannot be 
divorced from the overwhelming presence of the police state.  In September 1934, the 
presence of the SA and SS must have been  particularly noteworthy, bringing to mind the 
events of the previous months.  In July of the previous year, Hitler had decided to halt the 
revolution in order to stabilize the regime.  As a result, the SA became increasingly 
marginalized within the government, even though its numbers dwarfed those of the army.  
With the SA increasingly discontented, brawls with no overtly political motive became 
common.  Ernst Röhm, the leader of the SA, began to form a following within the SA, 
preaching a second revolution.  This proposed revolution would have the SA to replace the 
army, a proposition which naturally was not well received by the army.  With popular 
enthusiasm for the regime waning, the threat of revolution was even stronger.  The SA were 
out of control; Röhm needed to be overthrown.  On June 30, 1934, in what would become 
known as ―The Night of Long Knives,‖ SA leaders, conservative leaders, army officers, and 
Hitler's personal rivals were purged.  The majority of Germans admired Hitler for his 
decisive action, and the army was relieved to have the SA repressed.
185
 
 SA violence survived beyond its legitimate institutional threat, as exemplified during 
the Nuremberg Rally of 1934, when a fight broke out in the brownshirts' camp.  Although in 
this instance this violence was certainly not approved, the main issue for Nazis was not 
repressing the violence itself, but rather repressing opposition to the regime.
186
  To this end, 
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Hitler made an impassioned speech to both the SA and SS at the Rally on September 9, 
distancing himself from the violence of the Night of Long Knives and urging both SA and SS 
members to pledge their allegiance to the regime above all else.
187
  In concluding the speech, 
Hitler stated, ―Only a madman or a deliberate liar could say that I or anyone would have ever 
intended to lay to rest what we ourselves have built up over many years. No, my comrades, 
we stand firmly for our Germany, and we must stand together for this Germany.‖188  This is a 
repetition of a theme that flows throughout the speech – Hitler is careful to downplay 
divisions between the SA and SS, arguing that both are serving a stronger, more united 
Germany.  This was not simply a motivational speech; the purges had made clear the absolute 
requirement of following Hitler without reservation or complaint. 
 Even this demand for absolute adherence to the regime was not divorced from ritual, 
however.  According to Julius Streicher in Reichstagung in Nürnberg, a detailed account 
published by the Party of the Rally's speeches and events, Hitler's speech was followed by 
the consecration of the SA and SS standards by contact with the Blutfahne, or the Blood 
Flag.
189
  The Blood Flag was revered as the flag carried during the failed Beer Hall Putsch of 
1923 and thus carried special ritualistic significance.
190
   
 Every aspect of the Nuremberg Rallies was infused with ritual – even a speech devoid 
of any explicitly religious content, such as Hitler's address to the SS and SA, was followed 
by a ceremony with ritualistic qualities.  Just as the Blood Flag was revered for its central 
role in the violent Beer Hall Putsch, so too did the SA and SS flags symbolize the importance 
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of violent action in the creation of a Reich that would last for one thousand years.  It would 
be a mistake to view the consecration of the SS and SA flags as a ritual that was Christian; 
this was a military ceremony designed to encourage loyalty to the state.  But this ritual was 
only one of many, and, taken as a whole, it becomes clear that the planners of the Rally were 
acting with Christian ritual in mind.  Their Christian culture, Protestant or Catholic, informed 
their decisions when it came to implementing the Rally's rituals.  Many of the people who 
attended the Rallies or watched Triumph of the Will also approached their reception of and 
participation in the spectacle of the Rally from a framework of Christian belief and practice.  
Christianity and Nazism were not antithetical, although it is clear that certain aspects of 
Christianity would have to be suppressed as Germany moved ever nearer to war and the Final 
Solution. 
 It was not long after Hitler came to power than a proliferation of literature appeared 
that attempted to categorize the Nazi movement and Hitler himself as either Christian or non-
Christian.   Some claimed Hitler for their versions of Christianity, while others vehemently 
denied his association with orthodox belief.  After the fall of the Third Reich in 1945, as 
Christianity began to associate itself almost exclusively with resistance leaders such as 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer or Martin Niemoller, National Socialism and Christianity were almost 
universally seen as mutually exclusive.  This legacy exists yet today in the forms that 
accounts of the relationship between Nazism and Christianity take, and betrays a 
fundamental presupposition that has a large effect on the specific story historians tell: Hitler 
cannot be a Christian, because Christians would not commit the unspeakable atrocities that 
he did.  And yet, a close look at the Nuremberg Rallies of 1934 shows the clear symbolic 
70 
links between Christianity and the state.  Intentions aside, it is clear that practicing Christians 
attending the Rally would have found much with which to identify.  This Christianity was 
anti-Semitic, it was unorthodox, and it had disastrous effects for its enemies.  Christianity 
was not the only force driving Hitler in the direction of the Final Solution, but it did 
undoubtedly shape his decisions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
Bibliography 
 
Barsam, Richard. Film Guide to Triumph of the Will. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University  
 
 Press, 1975. 
 
Benz, Wolfgang. ―The Ritual and Stage Management of National Socialism: Techniques of  
 
 Domination and the Public Sphere.‖ In The Attractions of Fascism: Social  
 
 Psychology and the Aesthetics of the 'Triumph of the Right.' Edited by John Milfull.  
 
 New York: Berg Publishers Limited, 1990.  
 
Bergan, Doris L. Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich. Chapel 
  
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 
 
Blackburn, Gilmer W. ―The Portrayal of Christianity in the History Textbooks of Nazi  
 
Germany,‖ in Church History 49:4 (December 1980). 433-445. 
 
Brennecke, The Nazi Primer: Official Handbook for Schooling the Hitler Youth, Translated  
 
 by Harwood L. Childs. New York & London: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1938. 
 
Burden, Hamilton T. The Nuremberg Party Rallies: 1923-1939.  New York: Frederick A.  
 
 Praeger, Publishers, 1967. 
 
Burrin, Philippe. ―Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept.‖ In History and Memory  
 
9:1/2, Fall 1997. 321-349. 
 
―Datei: Bundesarchiv Bild 102-15234, Berlin, Luthertag.jpg,‖ Wikipedia: die freie  
 
 Enzyklopädie, accessed March 19, 2012,  
 
 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Bundesarchiv_Bild_102- 
 
 15234,_Berlin,_Luthertag.jpg.  
 
De Witt, Thomas E. ―'The Struggle Against Hunger and Cold': Winter Relief in Nazi  
 
72 
 Germany, 1933-1939.‖ In Canadian Journal of History 12:3 (Feb 1978). 361-381. 
 
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Joseph Ward  
 
 Swain. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1954. 
 
Ericksen, Robert P. Complicity in the Holocaust: Churches and Universities in Nazi \ 
 
 Germany. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
 
Evans, Richard J. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939. New York: The Penguin Press,  
 
 2005. 
 
Fabricus, Professor Cajus D. Positive Christianity in the Third Reich. Dresden, Germany,  
 
 1935. 
 
Fiss, Karen. Grand Illusion: The Third Reich, the Paris Exposition, and the Cultural  
 
Seduction of France. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009. 
 
Goodrich-Clark, Nicholas. The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their  
 
 Influence on Nazi Ideology; The Ariosophists of Austria and Germany, 1890-1935.  
 
 New York: New York University Press, 1985. 
 
Godman, Peter. Hitler and the Vatican: Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story  
 
 of the Nazis and the Church. New York: Free Press, 2004. 
 
Gurian, Waldemar, Hitler and the Christians. Translated by E. F. Peeler. New York: Sheed &  
 
Ward, 1936. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. II: Life-world and System: A  
 
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Translated by Thomas McCarthy. Boston: Beacon  
 
Press, 1987. 
 
Heller, Stephen. The Swastika Beyond Redemption? New York: Allworth Press, 2000. 
 
73 
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston: Houghton Mifflin  
 
 Company, 1943. 
 
Hoffmann, Hilmar. The Triumph of Propaganda: Film and National Socialism, 1933-1945.  
 
Translated by John A. Broadwin and V. R. Berghahn. Providence, RI: Berghahn  
 
Books, 1996. 
 
Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor W. The Dialectic of  Enlightenment. Translated by  
 
Edmund Jephcott. Standford: Stanford University Press, 2002. 
 
Israel, Jonathan. A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual  
 
 Origins of Modern Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
 
James-Chakraborty, Kathleen. German Architecture for a Mass Audience. London:  
 
 Routledge, 2000. 
 
Kershaw, Ian. The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation. New  
 
 York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Kertzer, David I. The Popes Against the Jews: The Vatican's Role in the Rise of Modern Anti- 
 
Semitism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001. 
 
Klemperer, Victor. The Language of the Third Reich. Translated by Martin Brady. New York:  
 
 Continuum, 2006. 
 
Larson, Erik. In the Garden of Beasts: Love, Terror, and an American Family in Hitler's  
 
 Berlin. New York: Random House, 2011. 
 
Lehmann, Hartmut. ―The Germans as a Chosen People: Old Testament Themes in German  
 
 Nationalism.‖ In German Studies Review 14 (1991). 261-273. 
 
Littlejohn, David. The SA 1921-1945: Hitler's Stormtroopers. Oxford: Osprey Publishing,  
 
74 
 1990. 
 
Mitchell, Allan, ed. The Nazi Revolution. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997. 
 
Mosse, George L. The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism. New York:  
 
Howard Fertig, 1999. 
 
Mosse, George L. Nazi Culture. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1966. 
 
Mundorf, Joanne & Chen, Guo-Ming. ―Transculturation of Visual Signs: A Case Analysis of  
 
 the Swastika.‖ Intercultural Communication Studies XV (February 2006). 
 
Neale, Steve. ―Triumph of the Will: Notes on Documentary and Spectacle,‖ downloaded from  
 
 http://screen.oxfordjournals.org/ at Western Washington University on December 9,  
 
 2011. 
 
Owings, Alison. Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich. New Brunswick, NJ:  
 
 Rutgers University Press, 1994. 
 
Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy of Fascism. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 
 
Reich, Wilhelm. The Mass Psychology of Fascism. New York: Pocket Books, 1970. 
 
Riefenstahl, Leni. ―Triumph of the Will.‖ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBfYncHshJc,  
 
 Accessed May 7, 2011. 
 
Riefenstahl, Leni. ―Tag der Freiheit,‖ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D_IWoMH17EY,  
 
accessed 3/21/12. 
 
Sax, Benjamin and Dieter Kuntz, Dieter, eds. Inside Hitler's Germany: A Documentary  
 
 History of Life in the Third Reich. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1992. 
 
Shirer, William L. Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941. New  
 
York: Popular Library Eagle Books, 1941. 
 
75 
Shirer, William L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New  
 
 York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. 
 
Sontag, Susan. ―Against Interpretation.‖ In Against interpretation and other essays. New  
 
 York: The Noonday Press, 1961. 
 
Sontag, Susan. ―Fascinated Fascism.‖ In The New York Review of Books.  
 
 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/feb/06/fascinating-fascism/,  
 
 Accessed 3/27/2012, page 1. 
 
Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York:  
 
 Galahad Books, 1970. 
 
Stiegmann-Gall, Richard. The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919-1945.  
 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Streicher, Julius. Reichstagung in Nürnberg 1934. Berlin: C.A. Weller, 1934.  
 
Viereck, Peter. Metapolitics: From the Romantics to Hitler. New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1941. 
 
Wilson, Colin. The Quest for Wilhelm Reich. New York: Anchor Press, 1981. 
 
